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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: THE REJECTION OF POSTMODERNISM 
BY TRADITIONAL HISTORIANS 
"Historiography"1 and "postmodemism" are two words that, until very recently, never 
occupied the same sentence yet alone the same discipline. However, given postmodemism's 
preeminence in rhetoric and literature, it is surprising that history, a discipline that largely 
concerns itself with written texts, has never felt the full effect of the "linguistic tum." 
Rather, most historians let out a collective groan when the word "postmodemism" is even 
mentioned. It is widely assumed by those both inside and outside of the historical discipline 
that postmodemism is a philosophy confined only to a group of fringe historians. As Perez 
Zagorin writes, "History ... has shown itself to be considerably more resistant to 
postmodemist trends [than literature]. This, at any rate, is the strong impression I have 
derived from the postmodemist debate among historians as well as from my reading of 
historical books and articles in diverse fields and from the statements of well-known 
academic historians" ("History" 9). Zagorin, one of the foremost objectors to postmodernist 
theory used in relation to historical inquiry continues, "As Kant once said of skepticism, it is 
not a dwelling place for the human mind; I believe that the same is equally true of 
postmodemism" (24). 
There are several reasons why postmodemism is generally regarded as incompatible 
with "doing history," and by exploring them, I will be able to better address the primary goal 
of this thesis: to articulate one of many possible "postmodemist" methodologies for inquiring 
into history. Before I do that, however, it will be helpful to look at my working definition of 
postmodemism, especially since the term is highly overused and misunderstood. Steven Best 
and Douglas Kellner write: 
-----~~-~~~~~-~--~~~~~-
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The confusion involved in the discourse of the postmodem results from its 
usage in different fields and disciplines and the fact that most theorists and 
commentators on postmodem discourse provide definitions and 
conceptualizations that are frequently at odds with each other and usually 
inadequately theorized. (29) 
While I am not prepared to sort out the strands of postmodemism or give a definitive 
explanation of all the nuances of its different forms, I do wish to address the aspects of 
postmodemism that I believe could have important bearing on the writing of history. 
Although postmodemism is sometimes thought of as being synonymous with 
relativism, an "anything goes" mentality in the arts, and the decline of Western culture, this 
popular conception ofpostmodemism is a gross simplification of it and is reflective ofhow 
the media portrays cultural life in contemporary America. However, when I use the word 
"postmodemism," I am referring to a certain epistemological viewpoint that acknowledges 
that the truth is difficult-or rather impossible-to ascertain. To me, postmodemism is a 
scepticism that should lead scholars to adopt a humility that admits that everything we 
"know" has been shaped by our own particular viewpoints made up of our presuppositions, 
preconceptions, and prejudices that we bring to the object of our study. Therefore, 
objectivity is impossible, because scholarship-even the selection ofwhat is deemed 
important~is highly shaped and determined by the personality of scholar. 
Postmodemism, in response to a plurality of perspectives that seem equally valid and 
yet produce different answers to the same questions, holds to the tenet that there is no 
ultimate truth, or if there is, it is unknowable. This is in some ways a reaction against the 
logical positivists who were operating at the end of the nineteenth century, who believed that 
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the entire universe was potentially knowable through the application of scientific methods to 
the objects under study. The positivists thought that everything could be explained by 
scientific laws. Of course, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has shown 
that knowledge-even scientific knowledge-is largely contingent upon language and 
symbol systems, and this book helped to dismantle a positivism that was already on its way 
out of the academy.2 While most historians today are squeamish about postmodemism, they 
cannot be said to hold to its opposite extreme, nai've positivism. 
Moreover, because postmodemists contend that there is no knowable ultimate truth, it 
follows that there is no absolute basis for meaning; instead, meaning is socially constructed. 
In other words, people make sense of their world by constructing self-referential systems that 
supply their own foundations from which knowledge can be built. Therefore, historical 
accounts ultimately impinge, not on reality, but on social conceptions about how that reality 
works. This means that there can be no "grand narratives" (to use Lyotard's term) or theories 
that explain life for all times and all cultures and all peoples (Best and Kellner 27). Insofar 
as some historians seek to find "covering laws" to explain historical occurrences, 
postmodemists assume that this is a vain endeavor. 
Additionally, postmodemism denies that the historian can be an objective observer of 
historical evidence and an objective author of historical accounts. Historians tend to see 
what they want to see from the evidence, and their own persuasions and biases about the 
evidence will ultimately surface in the narratives that they write. In fact, narrative, because it 
endows events with an interpretation of their meaning, can never be objective-there are no 
objective perspectives from which to write. Therefore, postmodemism would ask that 
historians stop writing history in such ways so as to assume a pretense of objectivity. 
-----------
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Instead, postmodemists want historians to be as self-reflexive as possible so that their readers 
can be more aware of some of the biases behind the writing ofhistory. 
Finally, postmodemism assumes that texts are not transparent, that is, authorial intent 
cannot be perfectly extracted from the text by the reader. Therefore, when the historian 
interprets past texts or pieces of evidence, he or she will face hermeneutical problems that 
can never be completely overcome. Moreover, the historian can never perfectly transmit an 
existential set of events through his or her account because readers of that account will face 
similar complications of interpretation. 
At this point, the reader might already recognize some qualities of postmodemism 
that seem to conflict with the epistemological basis that is usually required in order to "do" 
history. However, to explore these incongruities between postmodemism and traditional 
conceptions ofhistory systematically, I am providing the following list often reasons as to 
why postmodemism has not yet made a significant mark on the historical field. 
Historians Do Not Pay Much Attention to Theory 
Although it is only partly a factor, a large reason why the mainstream of the historical 
discipline has not embraced postmodemism is that most historians pay little attention to 
historical theory. Other historians, who might occasionally read articles that deal with 
theoretical matters, find theory mildly interesting but do not actively seek to apply theory to 
their historical methods. Across the discipline, there is a general feeling that historical theory 
is largely irrelevant to the practice ofbeing an historian, as Zagorin claims, "[T]he majority 
of professional historians ... appear to ignore theoretical issues and ... prefer to be left 
undisturbed to get on with their work ... " ("History" 2). Brian Tierney, a renowned medieval 
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scholar, confesses, "Metahistory is a fascinating subject in its own right, considered as a 
branch of epistemology or linguistics, but it has little to do with the activity of the simple 
working historian" (qtd. in Zagorin, "History" 2-3, n. 3). For a discipline that hardly gives 
heed to theoretical concerns, we should not be surprised if postmodernism has had little 
effect. 
Historians Have Been Influenced by Lawrence Stone and Ugly Debate 
For those historians who do pay attention to theory and the philosophy of history, 
many of them have been influenced by Lawrence Stone's 1991 article, "History and 
Postmodernism," which was a scathing indictment against postmodemism. This is not to say 
that individual historians are not able to make up their own minds about postmodemism; 
however, this article set the highly antagonistic tone of the debates between the supporters 
and haters ofpostmodernism in the discipline ofhistory. Those historians who were not 
directly involved in the debate might have been repulsed by such hostility, damning 
postmodernism-its cause-along with it. At least, Geoff Eley and Keith Nield believe that 
this might have been the case. Eley and Nield argue that Stone set the tone of the 
conversation between those in favor ofpostmodernism and those who are not by "call[ing] 
the profession to the defence of its integrity against the corrosive influences of relativism, 
post-structuralism, post-modernism, and other contemporary ideas" (356). Because of the 
alarmist stance Stone's article took, it is likely that historians who read it were left at least a 
little wary of postmodernism. 
----- ---~-- -----~--~-
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Historians Embrace the "Ideology of the Real" 
One ofthe largest objections to postmodemism is its seeming rejection of the real. 
Postmodemist historian Patrick Joyce labels this particular incongruity between traditional 
historiography and postmodemism the "ideology of the real" (78), that is, most (if not almost 
all) historians believe that historical events are real; true reality does exist; things did happen 
in times past. Many historians are under the assumption that postmodemism denies this 
basic tenet, which is so central to the pursuit of historical knowledge. 
For example, Chris Lorenz puts it poignantly that "history is a discipline and not a 
form of art" (314). As such, it deals with truth claims, not the imaginary or the unreal. 
Moreover, Lorenz argues that history is "an empirical discipline" (326, emphasis in the 
original). Lorenz believes this is so because, unlike the novelist, the historian interprets 
evidence that is known to others in his or her field; likewise, the historian must be able to 
withstand public criticism of his or her work. If history were not based on real knowledge, 
then challenges to historical accounts by other historians would be impossible. However, 
historians are constantly trying to deteimine "which narratives are empirically adequate" and 
which are not (323). Therefore, the historian is accountable to others in his or her field to 
produce narratives that square with the evidence. As Lionel Gossman says, "Modem 
historiography, like modem science, is a professionalized and regulated activity in which no 
individual can any longer imagine that he or she works alone or enjoys a special relationship 
to the past" (qtd. in Lorenz 326). Moreover, since the reconstruction ofhistory is largely a 
collective pursuit, historical evidence cannot be arbitrarily cast aside. Historians cannot 
ignore part of the available set of evidence "or make of it whatever they please" (Zag orin, 
"Historiography" 272). 
------ --~. ---------------- ------
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However, Joyce argues, "What is at issue is not the existence of the real but-given 
that the real can only ever be apprehended through our cultural categories-which version of 
the real should predominate" (78). It is safe to say that postmodemists also believe that real 
events occurred in history; however, the second an historian (or anyone else) attempts to 
articulate those events in language, an interpretation is occurring, obfuscating those real 
happenings. David D. Roberts, not a full-blown postmodemist but an historian whose work 
has been shaped by postmodem influences, acknowledges the "widespread 
misunderstanding" among historians that postmodemism "den[ies] reality and truth" (391). 
However, Roberts also defends historians against postmodemist claims that they purport to 
know objective truth: "[H]istorians have shied away from claiming full presence, the whole 
story; provisionality, incompleteness, and an element of guesswork have long seemed 
inherent to the historian's enterprise" (391). Ifhistorians would only switch their 
conceptions, seeing postmodemism as the dogma that denies that one can fully know reality 
and truth, they might find it fitting to their discipline. 
Historians Hold to a Less Exacting Definition of "Knowledge of Truth" 
One of the rifts between postmodemism and historiography is caused by the different 
views of truth of the postmodemists and historians. Although postmodemists believe that 
historians' attempts to portray objective truth are futile and deceptive, historians argue that 
they are aware that their accounts will be eventually revised; they genuinely believe in the 
tentativeness of their claims. The misunderstanding here arises, according to Lorenz, 
because the postmodemists view knowledge as episteme (that is, unimpeachable knowledge) 
while the historians view it as doxa (opinion) (322). Although this may seem like a reversal 
8 
of roles (postmodemists deny that episteme exists and wish for historians to see that they 
propound doxa, or a "truth"), Lorenz argues that postmodernists see a faulty "opposition 
between knowledge and interpretation" while the historical discipline inherently recognizes 
that all historical knowledge is merely interpretation of the evidence. Likewise, Roberts, 
who bridges the gap between postmodemist and traditional historian, argues that history is 
provisional (391). 
However, the potential unification ofpostmodemism and history is not advanced 
when Lorenz blames the disintegration of differentiating between these two kinds of truth on 
the former. "[S]ince episteme proved to be a false ideal, its distinction from doxa has 
evaporated, and fallibilistic truth-theories have taken the place of foundationalism and its 
picture theories oftruth" (325). If anything, postmodemism can be defended from this 
charge by asserting that most historical accounts at least pretend to be objective, which 
means that they state claims as if they were episteme even if their authors know those claims 
to be doxa. At the same time, if those authors believe the truth claims that they assert in their 
writings to be doxa while the postmodemist is telling them that the truth cannot be known, 
those historians are likely to think that the postmodemist knows absolutely nothing about the 
nature of the historical discipline. 
Historians Perceive Postmodernists as Misinformed about the Nature of History 
Part of the reason why most historians express hostility towards postmodemism is 
that they perceive postmodemists as unknowledgeable of the historical discipline and at the 
same time trying to tell them what to do. Hayden White claims that there is no set way of 
doing history, and therefore not much special training is needed in order to be knowledgeable 
---------~ ~-~------------ ~~ -~ ---
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of the discipline; however, many historians disagree with White on this point. These 
historians believe that historical evidence naturally dictates how accounts are logically put 
together and that those who deny this obviously are not well enough acquainted with the 
practices of the discipline. In rebutting the thought of the two "postmodemists" most 
frequently attacked by traditional historical theorists, Hayden White and F. R. Ank:ersmit, 
Lorenz argues, 
White's narrativism is built on two distinctions that do not show up in the 
practice of history: first, a distinction between literal and figurative language, 
and second, the exclusive use of literal language during the phase of research 
and the use of figurative language-read metaphor-during the phase of 
composition or writing. The same distinctions and presuppositions are, as we 
observed, crucial for Ankersmit's narrativism. (327-8) 
Clearly, Lorenz believes White and Ankersmit to be uninformed about the true nature of 
writing history. Thus he continues, "The 'metaphorical tum' as formulated by White and 
Ankersmit is therefore inadequate as philosophy of history and should be replaced by 
analyses that suit the practice of history better" (328, my emphasis). Lorenz speaks for most 
historians who, having never been educated to see the practice of writing history as a literary 
event, do not like to be told by those perceived as outside the discipline that they need to 
embrace more postmodem techniques of historic portrayal. Eley and Nield also comment 
about how historians react against postmodernism because of its practitioners' "sometimes 
peremptory, exhortatory timbre, its apocalyptic and apodictic tone" (355). Accordingly, 
most historians feel that the postmodemist camp is saying, "Historians must do this, they 
cannot ignore that, they had better get their general act together" (355). 
~~~---- ---------~~--~ ------------ ~--~~-~--
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Of course, this hortativeness does not rest well on the ears of historians who feel that 
the postmodemist does not have an accurate conception of the nature of"doing history." 
Zagorin points out what could be the most salient reason why historians tend to ignore or 
despise postmodemism: "most [professional historians] are unwilling the accept 
[postmodemism's] view of history because they find it so contrary to their own personal 
understanding and experience ofhistorical inquiry" ("History" 9-10). 
Historians Operate from an Epistemological Base Nurtured by Their Discipline 
By now, it should be obvious that the disciplines ofhistory and language arts rest on 
epistemological foundations that are at variance with one another. These differences in 
epistemology largely explain the cool reception ofpostmodemism in the field ofhistory. 
Historically, these differences arose because of the stratification and specialization of 
knowledge that occurred in the early part of the twentieth century. As Zygmunt Bauman 
says: 
In the vast realm of the academy there is ample room for all sorts of 
specialized pursuits, and the way such pursuits have been historically 
institutionalized renders them virtually immune to pressures untranslatable 
into the variables of their own inner systems; such pursuits have their own 
momentum; their dynamics subject to internal logic only, they produce what 
they are capable of producing, rather than what is required or asked ofthem; 
showing their own, internally administered measures of success as their 
legitimation, they may go on reproducing themselves indefinitely. (qt. in 
Joyce 80) 
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Ifwe take Bauman's words literally, it seems as ifpostmodemism will never stand a chance 
of penetrating the inner ring of mainstream historiography, for the two operate on different, 
incompatible systems of processing knowledge. As long as future historians continue to be 
trained by present historians, historians will keep insisting that with more evidence, they can 
arrive at increasingly more accurate pictures of the past and express them in nearly 
transparent language. Education seems to replicate the epistemological basis for each 
discipline. However, the possibility exists (and I think history shows) that epistemologies 
occasionally evolve into different ways of knowing. With today's increasingly accepted 
interdisciplinary pursuits, the chances that epistemologies will cross and produce new ways 
for determining what counts as knowledge will multiply. While the tendency for systems of 
knowing to become field-specific certainly explains why historians have been cautious of 
postmodemism, it does not pronounce definitively that the two will always be incompatible. 
As in the case of the discipline ofhistory, postmodemism has had few serious takers 
in the discipline of philosophy, probably because philosophy believes postmodemism would 
wipe it out. 3 "[O]f all the various areas of the humanities," Zagorin claims, "philosophy is 
the discipline in which postmodemism has made the fewest inroads and gained the fewest 
converts" ("History" 4). Zagorin has used postmodemism's poor reception amongst 
American philosophers to buttress his opinion that the theory is bad for the practice of 
history. Ironically, however, his claim seems to affirm the postmodemist idea of discursive 
communities that decide what their version of the truth is. While Zagorin believes that 
literary theorists and some fringe historical theorists are bad philosophers because they 
accept postmodemism while the philosophical discipline does not, this serves to show that 
disciplines tend to have their own epistemological hegemonies and are therefore entitled to 
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socially construct their disciplinary knowledge. Of course, by this same argument, rhetoric 
and other fields currently influenced by postmodemism should leave history alone. It is 
likely that ifpostmodemism is to play a significant role in historiography, a more collective 
approach to knowledge irrespective of disciplinary boundaries will first have to be operating. 
Historians Believe That Postmodernism is Just One of the Many Approaches to History 
Some historians do not reject postmodemism per se; what they do object to, however, 
are postmodernists who believe that theirs is the only way to construct an accurate history. A 
good case could be made that the discipline of history is not generally opposed to 
postmodemism when postmodemism merely regards itself as one way among many of 
assessing history. In fact, postmodemism has entered the debate among historians on how to 
do historiography as a number of recent articles in History and Theory suggests.4 Eley and 
Nield point out that historians "have been giving [postmodemist] issues some thought" and 
further insist that the discipline of history supports a pluralism of approaches to historical 
inquiry and historiography (356). Moreover, they, like several other historical theorists who 
are generally opposed to postmodemism, believe that postmodemism could have positive 
effects on historical practice when taken in bits and pieces. In reflecting on the proper 
relationship between historiography and postmodemism, they remind historians and 
postmodemists alike that postmodemism, just like any other theory, does not have to be 
"swallowed" whole by the discipline of history (358). 
Roberts, a good example of a historian who has embraced postmodemism but not at 
the expense of getting rid of more traditional approaches, argues for "nuance and 
differentiation" in historiography, as this results in the "productive tension within the 
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Western tradition" (391). Perhaps more historians would be open to postmodem ideas if 
postmodemism were not attempting to have a totalizing effect by declaring any historical 
account that has the ring of objectivity (i.e., a narrative) a bad one. After all, according to 
Eley and Nield, "[T]here is a pre-existing pluralism of practices and discussion ... , which 
cannot be disposed of simply by pronouncing the truths of the new" (356). Postmodemism, 
because it threatens to wipe out old scholarship and methods, is therefore viewed as 
menacing by most historians. 
Historians Assume that Their Discipline is Threatened by Postmodernism 
Because postmodemism objects to renditions of history that have the pretense of 
being objective, it would be potentially threatening to past accounts ofhistory, which-with 
the exception of those accounts that functioned as propaganda-almost always attempted to 
be objective. At least, most accounts employed an objective tone. In a reaction to the 
modem, the postmodem mindset jeopardizes previous historical writing that is deemed 
"insufficiently self-conscious about its own presuppositions and procedures" (Eley and Nield 
361 ). On the other hand, Eley and Nield argue that some of these modem historical accounts 
are the fruit of good scholarship and therefore should not be cast aside merely because they 
do not square with the prevailing "anti-positivism" (361). 
In responding to the postmodemist tendency to ignore Western history because of its 
close association with the linear model and purpose of history from the Christian tradition 
and the inheritance ofthe myth of progress from the Enlightenment, Roberts insists that 
forgetting our past would be dangerous. In fact, Roberts does this by appealing directly to 
the postmodemists: 
----~----~ 
----- ------------
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We cannot be reflexive without grasping the sense in which we belong to the 
Western intellectual tradition, which continues in our present discussion. [ ... ] 
It is not so bad-and it forecloses nothing-to recognize that we 
belong to a Western intellectual tradition and that we continue/it continues us 
as we respond. To overreact and insist on rupture instead is to limit our 
possibilities for both self-understanding and critical response. (398) 
Eley, Nield, and Roberts all voice concern that postmodernism, carried to its extreme, 
would seek to eradicate past historical accounts and with them, the sense of history that has 
made historians who they are today. Roberts calls for a "more productive relationship with 
our past," something that postmodernism can only do if it accepts the Western-based, 
objective-toned accounts that past historians left as their progeny. Postmodernists do not 
have to accept these texts uncritically, but if they are perceived as ignoring or negating these 
accounts, postmodernism will never gain a large acceptance in the field ofhistory. 
Historians Think Postmodernists Exaggerate the Opaqueness of Texts 
When confronted with the charge that their accounts presume a false objectivity, most 
traditional historians argue that they know their narratives to be highly tentative; they are not 
by any means dogmatic arguments about their conceptions of history. However, traditional 
historians see texts (written or otherwise) as being substantially more transparent than their 
postmodernist counterparts do. The same goes for their interpretations of evidence. 
Traditional historians believe that evidence is much more straightforward, lending itself to a 
common-sensical interpretation, than the postmodernists do. This might be the reason for the 
use of the objective tone in most historical texts, especially since the historian is less likely to 
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believe than the postmodemist that he or she has cause to be self-reflexive in his or her 
historical narrative. 
Of course, this difference of opinion about the opacity/transparency of texts (or 
evidence) has created some of the most major rifts between mainstream historiography and 
postmodemism. While historians acknowledge that texts are not completely transparent, 
Lorenz says that this 
does not lead to the favorite conclusion of postmodemists that language is 
'opaque' and not capable of corresponding to and referring to reality, but to 
the much more 'realistic' conclusion that reference and correspondence must 
be interpreted as relative and internal to specific conceptual frameworks ... 
(qtd. in Zammito 343) 
Lorenz objects to what he sees as the either-or fallacy of postmodemism, that if a text is not 
transparent, it must be opaque (314). However, as can be explained by the way that history is 
epistemologically different from the disciplines that have embraced postmodemism, 
historians believe that evidence can be reconstructed into likely accounts, which are by no 
means permanent. Common sense can aid the historian to the point where he or she is fairly 
certain that event x happened and it in tum caused event y to occur, but the historian knows 
that this knowledge is never fully unimpeachable. By trying to convince historians that both 
their evidence and the texts they produce are opaque, postmodemists insult the epistemology 
that is integral to the historical discipline; if historians were to accept that their texts were 
opaque, nothing smaller than a revolution would occur; history would be forever changed. 
Therefore, it is at least understandable why historians are a bit reluctant to take seriously the 
claims of postmodemism and apply them to their practice. 
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Moreover, the postmodemist's claim that texts are opaque and that narrative accounts 
of history, by introducing the element of human interpretation, do not accurately represent 
the past, seems a bit hypocritical to the traditional historian. To claim this, the postmodemist 
is assuming that he or she knows the accurate picture of the past to recognize that the 
narrative produced by the historian does not match it completely. This makes the 
postmodemist an empiricist (an ironic charge that many historians bring against 
postmodemists), as Zammito writes: 
[Ankersmit] writes: "history is often shown or interpreted in terms of what has 
no demonstrable counterpart in the actual past itself." The notion of 
"demonstrable counterpart" has all to much the ring of logical empiricism-
the search for some discretely observable phenomenon-about it. (344) 
Of course, as long as the postmodemists agree that they have no idea whether or not 
historical accounts accurately reflect the past or not, they can argue inductively that since 
historians' interpretations ofhistory can be demonstrated to be subjective (based on the 
amount of evidence available at the time and the presuppositions that color these 
interpretations), it is likely that those accounts do not accurately reflect the past, although 
those accounts may still be useful. If Zammito is right and the historical discipline is not 
threatened by interpretation but rather knows that its claims are constructed from the 
available evidence (cf. 339), then historians should not object to agreeing that while their 
accounts are not completely opaque, they are not as transparent as they commonly presume. 
However, there are still many historians who reject postmodemism on the basis that 
they believe that it is possible to write objective accounts and moreover, even if it is not, it is 
still more beneficial than harmful that historical accounts have a pretense of objectivity. J. C. 
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D. Clark, in his comparison of recent American and British historiography, writes, "Conflicts 
between modernists and post-modernists have revealed a surprising loyalty to objectivist 
understandings of historical truth" and surmises that this might serve an American civic 
purpose (795). However, this relates to another objection to postmodernism by historians: if 
it is widely acknowledged that all historical accounts are subjective, they say, then what 
forces will prevent history from being written as a propagandistic tool? (Roberts 395). Of 
course, the postmodernist would retort that historical accounts are already propaganda; by 
purporting to be objective, they are all the more ominous. 
Historians Consider Postmodernism to be Depressing 
Finally, some of the historical discipline's rejection ofpostmodernism is an emotional 
response based on misunderstandings and popular articulations of the theory. In some 
senses, postmodernism seems depressing and nihilistic, signaling the end of history. If 
modernism was largely characterized by the myth of progress, then post-modernism connotes 
the end of progress, which can only mean stagnation and apathy towards the discovery of 
new knowledge. Zagorin notes that some historians believe postmodernism to be "a new 
kind of nihilism threatening the very existence ofhistory as an intellectual discipline, 
and ... tend to regard themselves as a beleaguered minority defending the citadel of reason 
against its hordes of enemies" ("History" 3). Such is the case for thinkers across the political 
spectrum; both liberals and conservatives have reacted strongly against postmodernism. 
Zagorin, noting that the postmodern is "sometimes also thought of as synonymous 
with that of a posthistorical age" ("History" 6), admits that historians, in their rejection of 
postmodernism, might have been influenced by common perceptions of it owing partly to its 
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historical moniker. He writes, "[P]ostmodemism, as its name implies, carries with it strong 
connotations of decline, exhaustion, and of being at the end rather than the commencement of 
an era" ("Historiography" 264). 
*** 
Now that I have outlined some historians' objections to postrnodemism, I would like 
to correct what I perceive to be their misconceptions about the unpopular theory as well as 
use their valid objections to refine the way in which I will use postmodemism to explore a 
historical issue centered on two separate U.S. Supreme Court rulings for 1919 cases 
concerning the freedom of speech. However, before I do that, I would like to look in more 
depth at the thought of two scholars who spent a good deal of their professional careers 
engaged in theorizing about historiography: R. G. Collingwood and Hayden White. 
Although Collingwood's thought is acceptable to more historians than White's, the two have 
a lot in common, especially as they contemplate how the imagination plays into the creation 
of narrative accounts ofhistory. Eventually, by showing the parallels between Collingwood 
and White's thought on historiography, I hope to show that mainstream historians do not 
need to be alarmist about White's proposals for the writing of history. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION: R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S 
ANTICIPATION OF "POSTMODERN" HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The scholarship of Oxford philosopher R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943), sometimes 
considered the father of the philosophy ofhistory, perhaps represents the extent to which the 
mainstream of the history discipline is willing to embrace postmodemism. Interest in 
Collingwood, who is accepted by traditional historians as a brilliant archaeologist of Roman 
Britain, whose ideas on the philosophy of history are tolerated by historians because he was 
"one of them" and was knowledgeable of the methods of practicing historians, has grown in 
the last decade. Some even go as far as to label Collingwood's ideas "almost 'postmodem."' 
For example, David Bates writes: 
Certainly, his profound contributions to narrative analysis, his sophisticated 
historicist position, his "deconstruction" of historical practice, and his original 
ideas on the intimate link between 'evidence' and questions, put him at the 
forefront of that twentieth-century intellectual move away from questions 
about the meaning ofhistory, to studies on how historians create meaning, 
how the past is actually put together within concrete historical circumstances. 
(32) 
Yet, just as most historians have rejected postmodemism, they have also mostly 
ignored Collingwood's ideas about the philosophy of history, even while his posthumously 
published collection of essays on historiography, The Idea of History, is considered a modem 
classic. As Joseph M. Levine suggests, part of this undervaluing of Collingwood on the part 
ofhistorians might be due to the cloistered and unpublished status of many of his writings 
(86); since 1978, when his manuscripts were placed in the Bodleian Library, and 1994, with 
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the republishing of The Idea of History along with some previously unpublished papers, 
interest in Collingwood has resurged, even among "traditional" historians. 
Although he never uses the term "postmodem," Christopher Parker, in his recent look 
into modem British historiography, implies that Collingwood anticipated a postmodemist 
approach to the philosophy of history. However, Collingwood's epistemological views 
cannot be neatly categorized as either modernist or postmodemist. While Collingwood hints 
in his writing that truth is contextually based, there are several places in his Idea of History 
that indicate Collingwood would not be comfortable accepting a postmodem view of truth. 
Rather, Collingwood's thought forms an intermediate position between the certainty of 
positivism and the relativity of scepticism. His methodology for historical inquiry was 
revolutionary in the sense that he sought to abandon logical positivism and assert that the 
questions one asks ofhistory are as important as the answers. 
In somewhat of a contradictory fashion, Collingwood appears to accept ideas that 
would be labeled today as both modernist and postmodemist. James Patrick writes, "Austin 
Farrer ... was puzzled by The Idea of History because Collingwood seemed to assert that 
thought makes history, then to stress alternatively the similarities between human thought in 
all ages and the ability of thought to change the world" (99). However, if Farrer had 
understood that Collingwood held both essentialist and non-essentialist notions in tension, he 
might not have been confused. Unlike today's New Historicists, Collingwood believed that 
there was something universal about human nature; unlike the positivists of his day, he also 
believed human events to be unique and unpredictable. Either to assume that human history 
followed scientific laws or that it was completely unknowable was, for Collingwood, to 
commit an error of extremism. Some things could be absolute while others relative; not 
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everything had to be one way or the other. His Idea of History consistently affirms an 
epistemological position that falls between positivism and scepticism: 
It may be argued that history is not knowledge at all, but only opinion, and 
unworthy of philosophical study. Or it may be argued that, so far as it is 
knowledge, its problems are those of knowledge in general, and call for no 
special treatment. For myself, I cannot accept either defence. If history is 
opinion, why should philosophy on that account ignore it? If it is knowledge, 
why should philosophers not study its methods with the same attention that 
they give to the very methods of science? And when I read the works of even 
the greatest contemporary and recent English philosophers, ... I find myself 
constantly haunted by the thought that their accounts of knowledge, based as 
they seem to be primarily on the study of perception and of scientific thinking, 
not only ignore historical thinking but are actually inconsistent with there 
being such a thing. (Idea 233) 
Because he fought so hard against positivism (which still seems to rule today in the form of 
nomological theory or "covering law" models in historiography), it is appropriate for me to 
show how Collingwood anticipates a postmodem approach to historiography. However, 
because Collingwood is not a full-blown postmodernist, I will point out examples in his 
writing where he exemplifies foundationalist underpinnings. While I will rely on the 
scholarship of others who have grasped Collingwood's thought in more breadth than I have, I 
will mainly focus on two sections of the Epilegomena from Collingwood's Idea of History: 
section two, "The Historical Imagination," and section four, "History as Re-enactment of 
Past Experience." First, I will begin by giving a brief overview of Collingwood's 
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methodology; then, I will explain how those methods can be said to anticipate a 
postmodernist approach to historiography; next, I will call attention to some of 
Collingwood's modernist assumptions; and finally, I will draw some conclusions about the 
implications of Collingwood's thought on developing a more postmodern approach to 
historiography that takes into account the uneasiness that historians have concerning 
postmodernism. 
Collingwood's Methodology 
"As works of imagination," wrote Collingwood, "the historian's work and the 
novelist's do not differ. Where they do differ is that the historian's picture is meant to be 
true" (Idea 246). The foundation for Collingwood's historical method, therefore, was the 
belief that history exists only in an ephemeral sense; all we can know about history is what 
has been recorded and remembered. This leads to his most recognized tenet: "All history is 
the history of thought" (215), or put alternatively, "Of everything other than thought, there 
can be no history" (304 ). The reason why history is bound up in human thought is because 
history only exists as memory; because history does not exist in the present, it is not 
something that can be examined by empirical means. Moreover, because history cannot be 
studied empirically, the only way it can be thought about is imaginatively, as Collingwood 
wrote: 
Freed from its dependence on fixed points supplied from without, the 
historian's picture of the past is thus in every detail an imaginary picture, and 
its necessity is at every point the necessity of the a priori imagination. 
Whatever goes into it, goes into it not because his imagination passively 
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accepts it, but because it actively demands it. (245) 
Because people can only "know" history if they perceive it with their imaginations, it then 
follows that the only way to gain historical knowledge is by thinking the thoughts of others in 
history. This idea of re-thinking the thoughts of the past was Collingwood's main 
contribution to the philosophical study of history; it was, for him, the only way to know the 
past. Thus he writes, "[T]he re-enactment of past thought is not a pre-condition of historical 
knowledge, but an integral element in it ... " (290). 
Collingwood, because he assumed that written texts were more or less accurate 
records of thought, equated this re-enactment with mentally following the arguments written 
in these texts. While we can never know a writer's emotions, physical sensations, or even 
psychological state, we can know his or her thoughts through the written record (Idea 296). 
Collingwood believed that thought re-enactment was possible because although our present 
thoughts influence our interpretation of our memories, we can still sort out our thoughts and 
know the difference between the thoughts we had in the past and the thoughts we have now. 
If we can know our own past thoughts, Collingwood reasoned that we should be able to 
know the past thoughts of others. Therefore, he wrote: 
Ifthe autobiographer, although from the point ofview of simple recollection 
his past thoughts are inextricably confused with his present ones, can 
disentangle them with the help of evidence, and decide that he must have 
thought in certain ways although at first he did not remember doing so, the 
historian, by using evidence of the same general kind, can recover the 
thoughts of others; coming to think them now even if he never thought them 
before, and knowing this activity as the re-enactment of what those men once 
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thought. (Idea 296) 
Collingwood never recognized the problem of knowing whether or not one is discerning the 
author's intention in a text except to say that those who embrace doubts about actually 
knowing the author's thoughts are unnecessarily solipsistic. 
Even though Collingwood believed that the past could only be known by rethinking 
the thoughts of others, he envisioned that these past thoughts would be rethought in light of 
current thought. In other words, the past is never dead (because it is never really "living") 
but instead is created by present constructions of it: "Every present has a past of its own, and 
any imaginative reconstruction ofthe past aims at reconstructing the past of this present" 
(Idea 24 7). Here, Collingwood suggested that history is relative to the present, and because 
he believed in this historical relativity, part ofhis historical methodology involved the 
historian asking questions of the text that were appropriate to his or her current 
circumstances. Because new evidence is always resurfacing (and other evidence being lost) 
and the ways by which evidence is interpreted are constantly evolving (not necessarily for the 
better), "every new generation must rewrite history in its own way; every new historian, not 
content with giving new answers to new questions, must revise the questions themselves ... " 
(248). 
Collingwood also had a method for synthesizing the information gained from asking 
suitable questions of a text. Like Richard Rorty (perhaps Collingwood was a source for 
Rorty's ideas about epistemology), Collingwood believed knowledge to be web-like; that is, 
knowledge could be formulated only by drawing connections between pieces of evidence 
(functioning as pegs or "nodal points"). Because history cannot be empirically apprehended, 
the historian was guided by his or her a priori imagination to see connections between these 
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units of evidence (Idea 242). Of course, what this set of evidence looked like would be 
determined by the historian working from a specific point in history. Additionally, rather 
than do what Collingwood termed "scissors-and-paste" history, that is, merely use evidence 
handed down by "authorities," he suggested that the historian should be responsible for his or 
her own evidence. "We know that the truth is to be had, not by swallowing what our 
authorities tell us, but by criticizing it; and thus the supposedly fixed points between which 
the historical imagination spins its web are not given to use ready made, they must be 
achieved by critical thinking" (243). 
What kind of "critical thinking" was Collingwood calling for? If the sciences can be 
said to rely on empiricism to formulate scientific knowledge, then it appears that 
Collingwood advocated relying on intuition and personal experience-and not on past 
authorities-to construct historical knowledge. He writes: 
It is thus the historian's picture of the past, the product of his own a priori 
imagination, that has to justify the sources used in its construction. These 
sources are sources, that is to say, credence is given to them, only because 
they are in this way justified. For any source may be tainted: this writer 
prejudiced, that misinformed; this inscription misread by a bad epigraphist, 
that blundered by a careless stonemason; this potsherd placed out of its 
context by an incompetent excavator, that by a blameless rabbit. The critical 
historian has to discover and correct all those and many other kinds of 
falsification. He does it, and can only do it, by considering whether the 
picture of the past to which the evidence leads him is a coherent and 
continuous picture, one which makes sense. The a priori imagination which 
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does the work of historical construction supplies the means of historical 
criticism as well. (Idea 245) 
According to Collingwood, the way that the historian could discern truth from error was by 
examining how well each piece of evidence fit in with his or her coherent and non-
contradictory web of historical knowledge. Therefore, the ''whole perceptible world" could 
be evidence for the historian (247); Collingwood's standard was whether or not the potential 
"fact" squared with the rest ofthe historian's experience and expertise. It is now appropriate 
for us to look at how Collingwood's historical methodology represents a "pre-postmodern" 
approach to historiography. 
Collingwood's "Pre-Postmodern" Influences on Historiography 
There are several ways in which Collingwood's historiography answers the concerns 
that postmodernists have about the way most historians write history today. First, 
Collingwood was against what we now call the nomological approach to history, or the 
notion that history could be analyzed to discover "covering laws"5 that could be used to 
explain historical change. The second way in which Collingwood was a precursor to 
postmodern approaches to historiography was by embracing an epistemology that gave 
credence to non-empirical ways of discerning "truth." Finally, Collingwood stressed that 
knowledge-. at least the historical variety-is socially constructed, and he freely admitted to 
the historicity of interpretations of history. Our present thoughts influence our perceptions of 
the past, and each generation should ask different questions of the historical evidence-
questions that are tailored to suit timely needs. 
The distinctions that I am making between Collingwood's anti-positivism, pre-
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postmodemist epistemology, and tendency to see knowledge as socially constructed are 
somewhat artificial because the ideas that I have grouped into these three categories are 
highly contingent on each other. Collingwood was anti-positivist precisely because he 
valued ways of knowing that presented alternatives to the prevailing scientism; because his 
epistemology informed him about the historical nature of knowledge of history, he is 
considered by some thinkers to be a constructivist. Therefore, in no way should these three 
categories that I am using to systematize Collingwood's pre-postmodem ideas be thought of 
as cut and dried entities. 
Collingwood's Anti-Positivism and Reaction against the "Realists" 
Collingwood's most obvious similarity with postmodemism is his reaction against 
logical positivism, or the move to see history in purely scientific terms. According to Parker, 
Collingwood's "hostility to positivism became almost obsessive and distorted his own 
interpretation of the history ofhistoriography and ofthe philosophy ofhistory" (165). Yet, 
Collingwood was primarily reacting to the practice of using the methods of natural science to 
study historical phenomena. In his Autobiography, Collingwood wrote that the lack of 
suitable methods with which to approach history represented a "gap" in philosophy. 
However, he writes that his 
'realist' friends, when [Collingwood] said this to them, replied that there was 
no gap at all; that their theory of knowledge was a theory of knowledge, not a 
theory of this kind ofknowledge or that kind ofknowledge; that certainly it 
applied to 'scientific' knowledge, but equally to historical knowledge or any 
other kind [one] liked to name; and that it was foolish to think that one kind of 
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knowledge could need a special epistemological study all to itself. 
(Autobiography 85) 
In part because Collingwood recognized that the scientific method was not the best way to 
inquire about historical matters, he was at odds with the realists. James Patrick provides a 
good summary of realist thought: 
The realists considered knowledge, or the act of knowing, to be essentially 
objective, and sought persistently to rescue metaphysics and ethics for the 
implicitly personal, and hence implicitly psychological, moral and theological 
context in which both had been taught at Oxford. Truth was a fact or logical 
proposition, duty an obligation born of circumstance or context, religion and 
art emotions. (86) 
The realists thought that all knowledge could be grasped by scientific means. They assumed 
that history followed regular, universal laws that, once discovered, could be used to predict 
historical outcomes. However, Collingwood believed there to be a difference between the 
substance that could be properly studied through a scientific approach and the material that 
the historian examines: 
[T]he things about which the historian reasons are not abstract but concrete, 
not universal but individual, not indifferent to space and time but having a 
where and a when of their own, though the where need not be here and the 
when cannot be made to square with theories according to which the object of 
knowledge is abstract and changeless, a logical entity towards which the 
minds may take up various attitudes. (Idea 234) 
Instead of being something that could be objectively perceived by a commonly agreed upon 
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standard (like, for example, the boiling point of water at sea-level), history, to Collingwood, 
was "a logical entity" that could only be viewed from the unique perspective of the 
individual's imagination. Because it was impossible to empirically study a subject that had 
passed from present existence (Idea 282), all that was left were the historians' a priori ideas 
of history. As Collingwood wrote, '"the historian does not find his evidence but makes it, 
and makes it inside his own head. "'6 According to Peter Johnson, another way in which 
Collingwood diverged from the ways of the realists was in his insistence of the necessity of 
language to knowledge; "in Collingwood's judgement, realism is blind to the extent to which 
the very possibility of thinking depends upon the possession of a shared stock of concepts, in 
other words, a common vocabulary" (5). 
In a manner that prefigures the way certain humanistic disciplines today decry the 
scientistic belief that scientific knowledge is foundational, Collingwood was put offby 
historians who claimed their work passed the tests of "'scientific rigour"' (qtd. in Parker 
175). For one thing, Collingwood knew that it was impossible for the work of a historian to 
be completely objective because it was colored by the historian's own preconceived 
assumptions about the subject. "We remember, he said, what we want to remember, not 
'what happened'; we perceive 'what we attend to,' not what is there; 'we reconstruct history 
not as it was but as we choose to think it was."'7 He especially disliked the work ofthose 
who wrote textbook history because textbooks framed history as a set of facts rather than 
"'an inexhaustible fountain of problems"' (qtd. in Parker 204). 
Collingwood's Epistemology 
Because Collingwood did not believe that all truths could be apprehended by 
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scientific inquiry, he anticipated the epistemological revolution that would stem from the 
work of later thinkers like Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn. As we have seen, because 
history is not something that exists in the present, Collingwood believed that it could not be 
studied scientifically. Discovering historical truth, therefore, could not be the fruit of a 
positivistic enterprise. 
Instead, historical knowledge had to be apprehended by the imagination, and the 
imagination, after intuitively prioritizing the evidence, was guided by hunches and tacit 
knowledge gained through experience to construct a coherent narrative---essentially a system 
of belief. Sociologists today might call this system a "plausibility structure," others might 
coin it a "world view" or a "set of presuppositions," and still others refer to it as a "cultural 
myth or narrative." It is Collingwood's ability to see himself-and the positivists-in the 
context of such a system that makes his ideas ahead of his time. Patrick is right when he 
says: 
Perhaps it would be correct to say that, for Collingwood, there was a sense in 
which every scientific or historical fact is known by faith with respect to its 
participation in these fundamental presuppositions that render it knowable to 
all, and known by reason insofar as that fact testifies in its finite relations and 
characteristics to the accuracy and intelligibility of those fundamental 
supposals or presuppositions. (97) 
Here, Patrick is suggesting that Collingwood claimed that science, just like any other way of 
knowing, rested ultimately on faith in a set of "fundamental presuppositions." Patrick also 
argues that Collingwood, being a religious person, believed by faith in truths that could not 
be apprehended by reason (82-3). Because he believed in the transcendent, a spiritual reality 
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not easily recognized by humans, Collingwood was open to highly intuitive ways of knowing 
truth; as was fashionable among some academics at the time, he was mildly interested in 
extrasensory perception (Bates 35). While his religious faith gave him cause to reject logical 
positivism, the result of this rejection was that Collingwood was open to consider 
epistemologies alternative to the positivism that prevailed at Oxford. 
Instead of believing that every area of inquiry should be approached by science, as 
the realists argued, Collingwood thought that there was a particular "way of knowing" that 
best suited the subject under study. In fact, although it makes him seem a little like a 
nomologicalist, Collingwood saw epistemology-different kinds of epistemology 
specifically-as something that had evolved over human history. "With a surely very strange 
echo of Comte," writes Parker, 
Collingwood argued that, like the individual mind, mankind seemed to be 
progressing through phases of intellectual activity, starting with art, then 
going on to religion, then science, then history, and finally philosophy. Each 
was an advance on the one before as with Paleolithic art, Neolithic religion, 
Greek science, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history, and most recently 
philosophy, which, as Kant had said, had only just begun. This was very 
schematic; and he professed that these five forms of knowledge were only 
provisional; yet he had a scheme ofhistory relating to them (170). 
Perhaps Collingwood did not mean for this scheme to imply that human thought was always 
progressing; rather, he was merely discerning a pattern in the development of epistemologies, 
a historical pattern, he argued, that had happened to result in epistemologies in ascending 
complexity as time went on. At the same time, by his detection of this progressive pattern, it 
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is evident that Collingwood was partially under the influence of the modernists of his time. 
However, he stood mainly in opposition to these modernists; Collingwood thought that the 
positivists still operated under the old Enlightenment way of knowing-an epistemology that 
was fitting for the study of science, but not for history. He likely identified his own 
epistemology with the epistemology of philosophy and saw it as the proper way of inquiring 
after history. However, most historians of his day were still using the "historical" 
(Enlightenment) way of knowing, and they "failed to resolve the dilemma of how they could 
really know [historical facts], for the historians' vaunted objectivity hid their subjective 
selectivity; history and philosophy, therefore, had to merge so that the historians could truly 
understand their role" (Parker 177). Collingwood's prescription for the role ofthe historian 
in determining historical knowledge will be explored in the next section. 
Collingwood's Method and Social Construction 
As I said before in my discussion of Collingwood's methods, one ofthe most 
important factors in his methodology was the realization that "[ e ]very present has a past of its 
own" (Idea 247). Although Collingwood believed that the past had an ultimate existence 
apart from human thought about it, he recognized that present understandings of the past 
were largely constructed by contemporary intellectual thought. "This is not an argument for 
historical scepticism," wrote Collingwood (248). For Collingwood, ultimate Truth did exist, 
although humans could never quite attain a complete knowledge of it. For example, when 
writing about the act of reconstructing the past, Collingwood stated: "In principle the aim of 
any such act is to use the entire perceptible here-and-now as evidence for the entire past 
through whose process it has come into being. In practice, this aim can never be achieved" 
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(247). According to Parker, "That still left him, as he put it, 'in some perplexity as to the 
purpose ofhistory,' ifwe could never arrive at the truth" (179). However, since 
Collingwood did in fact continue to study history, he probably saw some immediate social 
value in constructing narratives of the past; he did say once that "the purpose of history is to 
grasp the present."8 
Today, rhetoricians and postmodemists would probably refer to the idea that 
historical accounts change with the times as "social constructionism" because it 
acknowledges the historical and cultural situation of the historian. Likewise for 
Collingwood, the acknowledgement of ever-changing histories led to the idea that historical 
knowledge is contingent upon the historian's perception of data. Although Collingwood 
would say that certain historical narratives are better than others (because of how well they 
corresponded to the context they served), he did not believe that there was one way of 
viewing historical data that held for all time. Johnson refers to this anti-foundationalist strain 
in Collingwood's thought as "strikingly modem" (lll 
Because all writers of historical accounts are historically situated, the historian needs 
to be aware of his or her own perspective, if only so that history can be written in 
contemporary terms. "[T]he historian himself, together with the here-and-now which forms 
the total body of evidence to him, is a part ofthe process he is studying, has his own place in 
that process, and can see it only from the point of view which at this present moment he 
accepts within it" (Idea 248). This idea that scholars are unable to approach their material of 
study from an objective viewpoint shows that Collingwood's thought was very much ahead 
ofits time. 
Moreover, Collingwood did not agree with most modem historians when it came to 
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the selection of evidence. He claimed that "there are for historical thought no fixed points 
thus given; in other words, ... in history, just as there are properly speaking no authorities, so 
there are properly speaking no data" (Idea 243). Because nothing could be taken as "given," 
it was up to individual historians to decide what "nodal points" were important to the webs of 
their historical accounts. Of course, it is likely that individual historians would be shaped by 
their academic climates, cultures, and places in the larger scheme of history. However, it 
seems that for Collingwood, personal history was as important as collective history: "even a 
single historian, working at a single subject for a certain length oftime, finds when he tries to 
reopen an old question that the question has changed" (248). Because Collingwood saw 
history as something that must continually be revisited, Collingwood would likely have 
objected to the idea of writing a universal historical account that could instruct all times and 
peoples. Every culture, every generation, even every individual had to keep rewriting history 
to serve its constantly changing perceptions of the world. 
Moreover, Parker points out that Collingwood acknowledged that writing history was 
only possible when one did not have all of the evidence. "Ancient history is history,' he said, 
because we know so little. Contemporary history was 'unwritable' because we know so 
much and because we have not yet digested what we know. Knowledge of contemporary 
history is 'too unconnected, too atomic"' (175). Collingwood believed history to be a human 
invention made possible only by neglecting (or forgetting) a sufficient amount of historical 
evidence. Parker suggests that these ideas show "a dangerously high level of relativism" 
(175), and perhaps this is why Collingwood's ideas, at heart, are unpalatable to most 
historians. 
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Anti-Postmodern Trends in Collingwood's Method 
While some aspects of Collingwood's historical method anticipate the application of 
postmodernism to historiography, perhaps his methodology can still be relevant to the work 
of most historians because there are several foundationalist assumptions that undergird it. 
First, Collingwood assumes that the "idea ofhistory" is an innate idea in the Cartesian sense; 
he argues that every person has a sense of history. Additionally, Collingwood does not see 
any potential hermeneutical problems in following the written arguments of others; 
moreover, it seems as if all texts are to be approached in the same way. It will be helpful to 
explore each of these foundationalist assumptions in further detail. 
Universal Idea of History 
Although Collingwood rightly points out that the work of the historian is never done 
(because the questions he or she asks keep changing with the times), and although he asserts 
that the historian "can never say that his picture of the past is at any point adequate to his 
idea of what it ought to be" (Idea 249), he maintains that historical inquiry could only be 
done via the historical imagination. "But, however fragmentary and faulty the results of his 
work may be, the idea which governed its course is clear, rational, and universal. It is the 
idea of the historical imagination as a self-dependent, self determining, and self-justifying 
form of thought" (249). Unfortunately, Collingwood does not give sufficient reason as to 
why the historical imagination is "self-dependent, self-determining, and self-justifying," 
although he does give ample defense why one cannot know history except through the 
imagination. According to Collingwood, the historian's use of his or her imagination is "not 
ornamental but structural" (241 ); it does not merely aid the historian in creating beautiful 
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prose, but actually assists him or her in arriving at historical material to write about. If 
history exists only in thought, then the only way to access it is through the imagination. 
However, my main concern here is not Collingwood's assertion that the imagination 
is necessary to the study of history-indeed it is-but his claim that the "idea of history" is 
"clear, rational, and universal." Perhaps using "the idea of history" as the criterion for 
historical truth would be practical if that idea were specifically situated for a given culture 
(e.g., a Christian idea ofhistory is vastly different from an Hindu one), but Collingwood 
shows that he believes that this idea to be universal. He continues: 
That idea [ofhistory] is, in Cartesian language, innate; in Kantian language, a 
priori. It is not a chance product of psychological causes; it is an idea which 
every man possesses as part of the furniture of his mind, and discovers himself 
to possess in so far as he becomes conscious of what it is to have a mind. 
Like other ideas of the same sort, it is one to which no fact of experience 
exactly corresponds. (Idea 248) 
Of course, New Historicists would cringe at Collingwood's use of the phrase "the furniture 
of every man's mind." Even if intuitive ideas (i.e., ideas "which no fact of experience 
exactly corresponds") adequately describe reality, Collingwood's suggestion that some 
intuitions are present in "every man" betrays his persistent foundationalism. Collingwood 
does not even explain what he means by his "idea of history" because he assumes that as it is 
an innate idea; his reader supposedly already knows what it is. However, as for the idea of 
history being an innate one, there is no concrete proof that all humans have a sense of history 
and/or change in time; in fact, Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob argue that 
even one's perception of time is largely conditional on social and technological factors. 10 
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However, when we explore the reasons why Collingwood cast the historical 
imagination as a universal concept, it becomes possible to understand his foundationalist 
claims. Collingwood wrote: 
Evidence is evidence only when some one contemplates it historically. 
Otherwise it is merely perceived fact, historically dumb. It follows that 
historical knowledge can only grow out of historical knowledge, in other 
words, that historical thinking is an original and fundamental activity of the 
human mind, or, as Descartes might have said, that the idea of the past is an 
'innate' idea. (Idea 247) 
Because the past must be thought about in its historicity, the historical imagination is a 
"fundamental activity" of the mind; Collingwood's reaction to the positivists, who were 
trying to perceive history as a set of "facts" that could be uncovered by empirical study, led 
him to insist that the idea that evidence can only be interpreted in light of the present was a 
universal phenomenon. In other words, Collingwood was insisting upon the relativity of 
historical reconstruction based on present conceptions of the past. 
Texts are Transparent and are Qualitatively the Same 
Another way in which Collingwood's writings demonstrate that he held some 
foundationalist beliefs is that they reveal the optimism with which he believed one could 
know the meaning of an historical text. Although he made a distinction between historical 
and "merely philological knowledge" (Idea 283), Collingwood really seemed to believe that 
the historian could accurately think the thoughts of others. 
However, postmodemists have several problems with this. First, language is not 
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inherently transparent, and the meaning that an author of a text is trying to convey might not 
be the same meaning that the reader is receiving. In addition to the usual problems of 
hermeneutics, even if the historian discerns the author's meaning correctly, according to 
Collingwood, "Merely reading the words and being able to translate them does not amount to 
knowing their historical significance" (Idea 283). While this statement could be accepted by 
postmodernists and historians alike, Collingwood suggests that historians discover this 
significance by "envisaging [the text] just as [the author] envisaged it" (283). Unfortunately, 
the only way Collingwood gives as to how this feat can be accomplished is by pretending 
"[the author's] situation were [the historian's] own, [and seeing] how such a situation might 
be dealt with; he must see the possible alternatives, and the reasons for choosing one rather 
than another; and thus he must go through the process which the [author] went through in 
deciding on this particular course" (283). However, the only way for the historian to detect 
the author's motives in such a case, then, is by assuming that they are congruent with the 
historian's own. While this would work if human nature were uniform (then human behavior 
might also be predictable), because people act in radically different ways for reasons that go 
beyond measurable factors, it is not really possible to say that one has determined another's 
thoughts merely by reading a text he or she has produced and imagining oneself in the same 
situation. 
To be fair to Collingwood, I am compelled to give his rebuttal of a similar objection 
to my own. When confronting the idea that we can never know for sure what another is 
thinking, he writes: 
... this appears a satisfactory account of historical thought only to persons who 
embrace the fundamental error of making for history that form of pseudo-
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history which Croce has called "philological history": persons who think that 
history is nothing more than scholarship or learning, and would assign to the 
historian the self-contradictory task of discovering (for example) "what Plato 
thought" without inquiring "whether it is true." (Idea 299-300). 
This excerpt from The Idea of History is puzzling because it seems to fly in the face of some 
ofhis other ideas, for example, Collingwood's insistence that the questions historians should 
ask ofhistorical evidence will necessarily change. 
However, perhaps Collingwood's main concern here was the linking of knowledge 
and practice-he appears to have been intellectually captivated by the concept, writing in the 
opening sentence of Speculum Mentis, "All thought exists for the sake of action." Although 
not everything could be known in its entirety, to Collingwood it was only ethical that that 
which could be known be put to use. According to Johnson, for Collingwood, "The 'big' 
problem [of learning] was how to find a satisfactory 'rapprochment' (A, p.77), between 
philosophy, history and practice" (4). Perhaps Collingwood thought that merely the illusion 
that one was thinking the thoughts of others could produce a type of knowledge that could be 
benevolently applied to help humankind. Parker also stresses that he "had a conviction that 
intellectual activity was supposed to make a difference, that it was not just an intellectual 
game, and ought to relate to life" (168). 
Yet another problem that postmodemists would detect in Collingwood's historical 
methodology relates to the observation that not all historical texts are set up as arguments to 
be followed; therefore, to assume that there is one method (i.e., following the logic of the 
author's thoughts) with which to approach all texts is unfounded. This is especially ironic 
since Collingwood himself felt the frustration when others insisted that he use a 
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scientifically-inspired methodology for the study of history. Even if one admits that Euclid's 
thoughts-as long as what one means by those thoughts is the sequence of logic involved 
with the proof that the two angles are equal---can be reasonably followed and, therefore, 
rethought, what if the document under examination is a diary, a letter, or even a declaration 
of war? How is it possible to rethink another's thoughts unless the writer systematically 
guides the reader through them in a detailed manner? Although every written document can 
be viewed as an argument for something, that document might obscure the author's 
motivations behind the writing; in that case, we could never know what the author was 
thinking; we might not even know where to begin, particularly if we know little about the 
context of the document. 
To be fair, I should mention that Collingwood did not think that the historian's 
reenactment of the past was a complete one; Parker believes that Collingwood meant that 
"because we are not that original person in that original circumstance, we cannot share the 
emotions that accompanied that scientific discovery or that military victory. The only 
emotion we feel is that ofhistorical discovery" (186). Also, rethinking another's thoughts 
does not mean, according to Collingwood, reliving the past in its original identity. In an oft-
quoted passage, he admits, "We shall never know how the flowers smelt in the garden of 
Epicurus, or how Nietzsche felt the wind in his hair as he walked on the mountains; we 
cannot relive the triumph of Archimedes or the bitterness ofMarius" (Idea 296). However, 
Collingwood continues this thought and like a positivist asserts," ... but the evidence ofwhat 
these men thought is in our hands; and in re-creating these thoughts in our own minds by 
interpretation of that evidence we can know, so far as there is any knowledge, that the 
thoughts we create were theirs" (296). 
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From this passage, it appears that Collingwood endowed "thought" with the 
characteristics not only of logic and reason but also with universality. True, we could never 
know the emotions or the experiences of the author of a text, but we could know his or her 
thought, if only because it followed the same patterns that our thoughts do. However, this is 
clearly evidence of Collingwood's underlying essentialism, and while his ideas about history 
existing only as a product of the a priori imagination might seem valid, his belief that 
historians can accurately re-think the thoughts of others poses problems for the 
postmodernist. 
* * * 
In the above discussion of the thought ofR. G. Collingwood, I hope that I have 
shown how the thought of this Oxford philosopher was historically more advanced than the 
scientific positivism that guided the historiography of his time and yet cannot be fully 
thought of as "postmodernist." Because Collingwood was perched between modernist and 
postmodernist thought, his ideas provide a logical mediation point for historians of a more 
traditional bent and rhetoricians who are concerned about the false pretenses of objectivity 
that historians tend to operate on. Just as Collingwood longed for a "rapproachment" 
between history and philosophy, his ideas might form the basis for a rapproachment between 
history and rhetoric, two disciplines that have epistemologies that are currently at odds with 
one another. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION: HAYDEN WHITE'S 
"POSTMODERN" HISTORIOGRAPHY AND 
COMPARISON WITH COLLINGWOOD 
In my view, history as a discipline is in bad shape today because it has lost 
sight of its origins in the literary imagination. In the interest of appearing 
scientific and objective, it has repressed and denied to itself its own greatest 
source of strength and renewal. By drawing historiography back once more to 
an intimate connection with its literary basis, we should not only be putting 
ourselves on guard against merely ideological distortions; we should be by 
way of arriving at that "theory" of history without which it cannot pass for a 
"discipline" at all. (H. White, Tropics 99) 
If Collingwood believed that history consisted ofthe historian's narrative of it, 
Hayden White was quick to point out that one should never confuse narratives with history. 
Yet, ironically, these two thinkers shared much in common in their conceptions ofhistory. 
Collingwood stressed that history-as a set of actual events-was something that could never 
be studied directly, and therefore "history" was merely how humans decided to write up 
those events. White developed Collingwood's first idea and said that because we could 
never communicate those events in an objective manner if we used narrative, it was wrong to 
think of those events as being congruous with what had been written about them in story 
form. White himself said that his 
conception of historiography bears a number of striking resemblances to those 
ofNorthrop Frye and the lateR. G. Collingwood. Both of these thinkers 
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analyze the element of "construct" in historical representation, the extent to 
which the historian must necessarily "interpret" the "data" given him by the 
historical record in order to provide something like an "explanation" of it. (57) 
White struggled (and still does) during his academic career to get historians to realize that by 
writing historical narratives, they are imbuing events with meaning and essentially 
participating in an enterprise that varies little from the novelist's. However, this is hardly a 
new insight; we heard this before from Collingwood: "As works of imagination, the 
historian's work and the novelist's do not differ" (Idea 246). 
It is frequently pointed out that traditional historians are inimical to White's ideas, but 
surprisingly, these same historians claim to like Collingwood. However, there is a continuity 
between the ideas of Collingwood and White that should not be ignored. Perhaps the 
similarity in their thoughts stems from the influence that Giambattista Vico and Benedetto 
Croce had on both ofthem-both Collingwood and White can be thought of as the direct 
heirs of the thought of these two Italian philosophers. In this chapter, after providing an 
overview of White's contributions to historiography, I hope to show that White's ideas share 
a peculiar resemblance to Collingwood's, although the former thought that the latter did no 
go far enough when it came to stressing that events do not come to the historian laden with 
meaning (H. White, Tropics 84). 
Specifically, I will examine two of White's essays from his collection Tropics of 
Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism, "The Burden of History" and "The Historical Text 
as Literary Artifact." RichardT. Vann notes that these are two of White's most cited works 
(144), and they provide ample entree into White's historiographic theories. While many 
scholars have concluded that White's thought is highly inconsistent with itself, so too is the 
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interpretation of White; nearly everyone gives a different "reading" of him. Although most 
scholars (particularly those from the history discipline) familiar with White characterize him 
as a postmodernist, some have been as savvy as to point out that he is more of a structuralist, 
or at least that he shows some foundationalist assumptions and is very taken with formalist 
literary theory. At any rate, I consider these two essays of White's to be representative of his 
thought, and it is particularly fitting to look at these pieces because many the ideas contained 
within them have caused traditional historians to dismiss White. 
White's Major Contributions to Historiography 
Before I delineate the similarities between the thought of Collingwood and White, it 
would be best for me to summarize White's contributions to the philosophy ofhistoriography 
as much as it is possible to encapsulate these ideas. 11 V ann writes, "Extracting from him--or 
imposing upon him-a systematic philosophy of history is impossible, and it may seem that 
he is only ushering the flies into new fly-bottles. His forte is fecundity, not fixity, of 
thought" (161). Yet, one must start somewhere, and it serves my purpose to discuss several 
themes that I discern in White's writings: (1) the inherent meaninglessness of past events; (2) 
the historian's "emplotment" of those events into one ofFrye's archetypal plots: romance, 
comedy, tragedy, and satire; (3) the historian's use ofliterary tropes (metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony) to describe those events; (4) the evaluation ofhistorical accounts on 
the basis of internal consistency with the historian's purpose; (5) the belief that historical 
knowledge should be useful to the present concerns of society and the academy; and (6) an 
ultimate appeal to move away from narrativity in constructing the past. Except for White's 
suggestion that the historian find other ways of communicating the past other than by using 
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narrative, each of the other themes can be traced back to similar ideas expounded by 
Collingwood. Therefore, White's ideas should not be regarded as incredibly revolutionary; 
his writings are a reaction against the nineteenth-century realist historians for the same 
reasons that Collingwood's were. If White's thought can be said to be a development beyond 
Collingwood's, it is because White acknowledged the subjectivity of narrative and, unlike 
Collingwood, he was not fully comfortable with it. For White, an ideal historical account 
would be objective, which is why he considers narrative accounts to be less than perfect. 
The Meaninglessness of the Past 
Narratives, because they endow past events with meaning, can never be true accounts 
of history since they add something to it. White believed that historical events did not have 
any inherent meaning; rather, their meaning, or interpretation, was bestowed on them by the 
historian. This is part of the reason why the same event can have different meanings for 
various peoples and times, as obviously the dropping of the atomic bomb means something 
different to the Japanese than it does to the Americans. "[N]o historical event is intrinsically 
tragic .... For in history what is tragic from one perspective is comic from another" (H. 
White, Tropics 84). 
Because events do not have intrinsic meaning, it follows that narratives-written 
accounts that show the relationships between events-do not exist in nature either. White 
writes, "[T]here has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as what they most 
manifestly are: verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented as found and the 
forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have 
with those in the sciences" (Tropics 82). Meaning is a social construct given to detached 
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elements, and historians, whether they know it or not, give the past meaning when they tum 
events it into a story. In an echo of Collingwood, White writes, 
The events are made into a story by the suppression of certain of them and the 
highlighting of others, by characterization, motif repetition, variation of tone 
and point of view, alternatives descriptive strategies and the like-in short, all 
of the techniques that we would normally expect to find in the emplotment of 
a novel or play (84). 
Many historians and philosophers of history, including Noel Carroll, have criticized 
White's assertion that stories do not exist in nature by pointing out that the events in 
individual lives can be said to constitute stories. Against White's premise that "We do not 
live stories even if we give our lives meaning by retrospectively casting them in the form of 
stories" (90), Carroll contests that people often plan the series of events in their lives and 
then go about living them according to the script (143). However, Carroll neglects to see that 
if it were possible to predict accurately events that eventually transpire, it is still by act of 
interpretation that we impose a story on these events before the fact. It does not matter if this 
story is given to the events before or after they occur; a story still represents a human 
construct that has been added to events. 
A more sound criticism to White's claim that past events are meaningless apart from 
human interpretation of them (besides the idea that they could be given meaning by God, an 
idea that Carroll rejects but nonetheless points out on p. 148) is that events could be said to 
have an inherent meaning found in their causal relationships with other events. While the 
dropping of the bomb has disparate meanings for people living in Japan and America, the 
events that ensued because of the bombing are universal because they occurred regardless of 
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human interpretation of them. In a sense, then, the bombing meant that other events would 
thus occur. One could argue that an account that merely showed the causal relationship 
between a series of events would constitute a story (because it shows events in a 
chronological fashion) and yet be untainted by the meaning that humans confer upon those 
events. Unfortunately, such an argument presupposes that causal relationships between 
events are easy to detect; also, it ignores the fact that one event may trigger several, 
innumerable and immeasurable events. Therefore, even when the historian attempts to show 
the causal relationships between two or more events, he or she is still imposing an 
interpretation upon them by (1) arguing that they indeed share a causal bond and (2) 
"subordinat[ing] certain of them and ... highlighting others" (H. White, Tropics 84). 
Since events do not have meaning apart from the meaning given to them by human 
constructions of a series of events (for meaning is also conferred upon history when the 
historian selects the beginning and the ending events in an account), White contends that the 
way historians give meaning to history is by aligning events into one of the generic plot 
structures. 
Emplotment: Framing Events into Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, and Satire 
If White thinks that the historian is the responsible agent for "emplotment"--or 
giving events their meaning, he also believes that there are a limited number of plot 
structures from which historians can choose: those that are predetermined by their culture. 
By "emplotment," White means "simply the encodation of the facts contained in the 
chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures, in precisely the way that Frye 
has suggested is the case with 'fictions' in general" (Tropics 83). White believes that the plot 
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structures catalogued by Frye (romance, comedy, tragedy, and satire) are genres that people 
in Western societies readily recognize and use to construct meaning. White claims, "The 
historical narrative thus mediates between the events reported in it on the one side and 
pregeneric plot structures conventionally used in our culture to endow unfamiliar events and 
situations with meanings, on the other" (Tropics 88). 
If we are to analyze seriously what White's ideas mean for the writing of history, the 
four Fryean plot structures deserve to be defined in detail. In The Harper Handbook to 
Literature, of which Frye is an editor, romance is described in broad terms as "a continuous 
narrative in which the emphasis is on what happens in the plot, rather than on what is 
reflected from ordinary life or experience" (401). Although it is obvious that most literary 
romances have some kind of love story, it should not be forgotten that romances frequently 
concern adventure or a threat that must be overcome by the hero. Eventually, the hero 
succeeds and ends up together with the heroine at the "end," which is never really the end 
because there still exists the potential for more adventure. In U.S. history, many accounts of 
the western expansion were written as romances, with settlers exploring the unknown land 
and facing possible danger from the American Indians. The ideal of"Manifest Destiny," 
with America claiming the land between both oceans, was the obvious end to this romance, 
although once this ideal was achieved, more adventures in "taming" the land were sure to 
play out. 
Frye's definition of comedy is one that has two sides: "one an absurd reversal of the 
normal order, the other pragmatically more sensible" (110). Although comedy can either be 
absurd or realistic, its typical plot structure involves an underdog hero who wants to marry a 
woman who is his social superior. A comical, charismatic villain tries to keep them apart, 
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but to no avail once "[a] mystery ofbirth, affecting either hero or heroine,[ ... ] bring[s] 
about the comic resolution" (111). 
Tragedy, according to Frye, is "a serious FICTION involving the downfall of a hero or 
heroine" ( 465). There are three main themes evident in a tragedy: (1) isolation of the main 
character from the rest of the community, (2) violation and revenge, and (3) a tragic flaw or 
obsessive passion ( 466). 
Finally, satire is defined by Frye as "[l]iterature that ridicules vices and follies" (413), 
but he also points out that satire "now means [ ... ] a tone of antagonism between the writer 
and the material which may be found in any genre" (414). Closely related to satire is irony, 
which Sheridan Baker, Frye's co-editor, generally considers to be "the perception of a clash 
between seems and is, or between ought and is" (250). Baker also sheds light on the 
interrelation ofFrye's plot structures: 
In Anatomy ofCriticism (1957), Northop Frye sees Irony as one ofthe four 
archetypal mythoi, or ways, in which we perceive the world and its works. 
Irony, or SATIRE, is the polar opposite of ROMANCE, the wry realities opposite 
the wishful dream, just as TRAGEDY is the opposite of COMEDY. If we think of 
a circle, with Romance at the top and Irony at the bottom, Tragedy at the right 
and Comedy at the left, we can see how the four modes blend. The arcs of 
Romance and Irony have their tragic or comic tinges at one end or the other. 
(252) 
While White believed that Frye's "pregeneric plot structures" provide historians with 
guidelines on how to construct the meaning of events, events themselves do not dictate 
themselves into one plot archetype over the others. "Historical situations are not inherently 
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tragic, comic, or romantic," writes White. "They may all be inherently ironic, but they need 
not be emplotted that way" (Tropics 85). 
There is some question as to whether White should have also included "epic" in his 
list ofthe standard plot structures, and indeed he even makes mention of this genre in one of 
his lists of the structures. However, the issue of whether or not to include "epic" as an 
archetypal structure poses a more serious criticism: why does White believe that there are 
only four or five plots that the historian has to choose from when relaying a series of events? 
To the true postmodemist, this problem seems to align White with the formalists. Later, 
White added "pastoral" and "farce" to the list ofemplotment structures (Vann 160), but it 
seems as if White's work would be better served not by focusing on the nomenclature and 
use of these structures as ways of classifying plots but by asserting that the historian applies 
an emplotment structure to a series of events when he or she transforms it into a narrative. 
However, it does not matter what kind of plot structure is employed by the writer of history; 
White's main point is still not lost: without a structure that gives events meaning, narrativity 
is impossible. 
The Four Tropics: Metaphor, Metonymy, Synecdoche, and Irony 
White posits that it is possible that historians do not recognize that their narratives are 
humanly constructed rather than found in the relationships between events because of the 
way that historical events are described or rendered in their minds prior to their writing of 
narratives (Tropics 94). Just as there are four (at least in his original conception) emplotment 
structures that can be used to illustrate the relationships between events, White gives four 
ways of describing events: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. These four 
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descriptive techniques (tropes or tropics) are taken from Vico, who merely reproduced "a 
Renaissance tradition in reducing the figures of speech to four" (Domanska 177). White 
calls these the "four principle modes of representation" and partly defends their use in history 
by something he heard Geoffrey Hartman say at a conference: that writing history meant 
placing events in their contexts, or relating a part (event) to a whole (context). "[Hartman] 
went on to suggest that as far as he knew, there were only two ways of relating parts to 
wholes, by metonymy and by synecdoche" (Tropics 94). This triggered in White a 
remembrance ofVico's tropes, and he concluded that because history "has not yet become 
disciplinized to the point of constructing a formal terminological system for describing its 
objects" (95), the historian had to use one of these tropes when describing an event. 
What Constitutes a Good Historical Narrative 
For White, a good historical account was one that did not purport to be universal. 
Writing that an account should "be judged solely in terms of the richness of its metaphors," 
White continues, 
Thus envisaged, the governing metaphor of an historical account could be 
treated as a heuristic rule which self-consciously eliminates certain kinds of 
data from consideration as evidence. The historian operating under such a 
conception could thus be viewed as one who, like the modem artist and 
scientist, seeks to exploit a certain perspective on the world that does not 
pretend to exhaust description or analysis of all of the data in the entire 
phenomenal field but rather offers itself as one way among many of disclosing 
certain aspects of the field. (Tropics 46) 
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White is arguing here that the historian should give up all attempts to construct an objective 
account of the past. Even if the historian knows that his or her account cannot be objective, it 
is unfair to the reader if the historian represents history in a form that confers the illusion of 
objectivity upon the narrative. However, if the historian admits to his or her readers the ways 
in which his or her views on a subject are limited, then the historian will gain more 
credibility, and the account will be "one way among many" of representing the truth. For 
White, historical accounts should be appraised in the same manner that art is; he points out 
that we do not have to decide which painting-Cezanne's or Constable's-is "'more 
correct"' (Tropics 46). Lest anyone accuse White ofbeing a relativist, he argues: 
The result of this attitude is not relativism but the recognition that the style 
chosen by the artist to represent either an inner or outer experience carries 
with it, on the one hand, specific criteria for determining when a given 
representation is internally consistent and, on the other, provides a system of 
translation which allows the viewer to link the image with the thing 
represented on specific levels of objectification. (46-7) 
White seems to be implying that when the historian writes in a certain method of 
emplotment, his or her readers will recognize that genre and thus be able to interpret the 
information the historian gives them in light of that genre. For example, when a Japanese 
historian is describing the dropping of the atomic bomb in terms of a tragedy, the reader can 
realize that this is merely one reading of the event-an event that surely has a tragic side, but 
also one that can be interpreted as bringing about the end of a war and thus possibly saving 
more lives. 
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Giving History Its Meaning Back 
In "The Burden of History," White gives a history of how the discipline of history has 
come to be despised by the other academic disciplines, using as his evidence novels like 
those by Ibsen, Eliot, and Camus that have portrayed historians as having a morbid 
fascination with the past and failing to see the benefit that such historical knowledge could 
bring to the present. White claims that unlike the other areas of academic inquiry, history 
never evolved beyond its early nineteenth century stage-its golden age. Rather, "historians, 
for whatever reason, had become locked into conceptions of art and science which both 
artists and scientists had progressively to abandon if they were to understand the changing 
world of internal and external perceptions offered to them by the historical process itself' 
(Tropics 42). Pointing out that history sees itself as situated midway between art and 
science, White argues that it failed to adopt the continually metamorphosing theories of 
either art or science and now operates without a theory other than one that combines a 
romantic notion of art with a positivistic view of science. Moreover, the "theory" or 
methodology that the discipline ofhistory operates under is not very substantive: 
After all, historians have conventionally maintained that neither a specific 
methodology nor a special intellectual equipment is required for the study of 
history. What is usually called the "training" of the historian consists for the 
most part of study in a few languages, journeyman work in the archives, and 
the performance of a few exercises to acquaint him with standard reference 
works and journals in his field. For the rest, a general experience ofhuman 
affairs, reading in peripheral fields, self-discipline, and Sitzfleisch are all that 
are necessary. Anyone can master the requirements fairly easily. (40) 
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sees no value in knowing the past for its own sake. Thus he says, "The contemporary 
historian has to establish the value of the study of the past, not as an end in itself, but as a 
way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems 
peculiar to our own time" (Tropics 41). White merely wants historians to use the 
opportunities their discipline affords them for productive and benevolent purposes: 
The methodological ambiguity of history offers opportunities for creative 
comment on past and present that no other discipline enjoys. If historians 
were to seize the opportunities thus offered, they might in time convince their 
colleagues in other fields of intellectual and expressive endeavor ofthe falsity 
ofNietzsche's claim that history is "a costly and superflous [sic] luxury ofthe 
understanding." ( 48) 
Moving Beyond Narrative 
Although some scholars claim that White stressed the value of narrative in 
communicating history,12 ultimately this is a faulty conclusion that should not be drawn 
merely because White focused so much of his work on narrative. In actuality, White was 
working to show that narrative could never represent accurate history because it always 
added a human dimension to it. Contrary to the charges of some of his critics, White believed 
that past events were real, 13 and his definition of"history" diverges from Collingwood's in 
that history was comprised of these real events. For White, the problem with narrative was 
that it gave meaning to these events, and thus it ceased to portray reality. In The Content of 
the Form, White asked, "Is narrativity itself an ideological instrument?" (81 ). While White 
does not directly answer that question himself, he seems to imply that in some cases, at least, 
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it is. 
Therefore, White's ideal was history in a non-narrative form. Vann draws attention 
to White's idea of a narrativeless historical account mentioned briefly in The Content of the 
Form. According to Vann, it '"seem[ed] plausible"' to White to "refus[e] to attempt a 
narrativist mode for the representation ofits-history's?-truth" (160). Rather, White 
encouraged the historian to "reconceiv[ e] conventional notions of time so that, for example, 
events can be seen not as successive episodes of a story, but as random occurrences" (160-
61). He hinted that this approach to history would result in the "historical sublime": 
If [ ... ] it is possible to imagine a conception of history that would signal its 
resistance to the bourgeois ideology ofrealism by its refusal to attempt a 
narrativist mode for the representation of its truth, is it possible that this 
refusal itself signals a recovery of the historical sublime that bourgeois 
historiography repressed in the process of its disciplinization? And if this is 
or might be the case, is this recovery of the historical sublime a necessary 
precondition for the production of a historiography of the sort that 
Chateaubriand conceived to be desirable in times of"abjection"? A 
historiography "charged with avenging the people"? This seems plausible to 
me. (Content 81 ). 
However, perhaps because White knew that he would be going too far to suggest that 
historians give up their techniques of telling stories to record the past, he believed that 
narrative could be redeemed if historians would only be aware of-and admit to the reader-
the fictitious spin they were adding to historical accounts by constructing them as narratives. 
At the same time, an ideal historical account would not use narrative-which, for the 
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historian, usually took on the flavor of an early 19th century novel-at all. 
In "The Burden of History," White praises Jacob Burckhardt for his attempt to tell the 
past without putting it in story form. White notes that Burckhardt, refusing to adhere to the 
old historiographical methods that had stagnated in the discipline of history, experimented 
with the artistic techniques of his day to produce a unique perspective on his subject-a 
perspective not tied down by chronological conventions. White writes: 
[O]nce he was freed from the limitations of the "storytelling" technique, he 
was liberated from the necessity of construction a "plot" with heroes, villains, 
and chorus, as the conventional historian is always driven to do. Since he 
possessed the courage to use a metaphor constructed out of his own immediate 
experience, Burckhardt was able to see things in the life of the fifteenth 
century that no one had seen with a similar clarity before him. Even those 
conventional historians who find him wrong in his facts grant to his work the 
title of a classic. What most fail to see, however, is that in praising 
Burckhardt they often condemn their own rigid commitment to conceptions of 
science and art which Burckhardt himself had transcended. (Tropics 45) 
Narratives, insofar as they blinded the historian from seeing the subjectivity of his or her own 
historical account, were not benign in White's opinion. Moreover, they tended to give the 
reader the impression that there was no narrator-thus making accounts of the past seem to 
be impartial and accurate reflections of the past. 
So that narratives would lose their illusory effect of objectivity, White advocated 
writing in what he called the "middle voice." In English, we usually speak oflanguage as 
either being in the active or passive voice, but Greek adds to this distinction a middle voice. 
---~ ~---~ --
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F. R. Ankersmit describes the middle voice as "'elousamen,' meaning "I wash myself," 
which is therefore indeed somewhere midway between the active 'I wash' and the passive 'I 
am washed"' (189). It is only in this middle voice that White believed history can be 
accurately represented because the middle voice eliminates the notions of objectivity and 
subjectivity: the object and the subject of the sentence are the same. So what does writing in 
the middle voice look like? Ankersmit mentions Roland Barthes' s idea of "I write myself," 
in which the author discovers his or her true self only through the act of writing (190). To 
this, Ankersmit adds, "Especially ifwe think of the monologue interieur, that hallmark of the 
modernist novel, we will see that this literary device destroys all clear boundaries between 
subject and object, between the self and what is outside the self' (190). 
Because so many consider him to be a postmodernist, it is ironic that White actually 
believes that the representation of history achieved through abandoning narrative constructs 
can be an objective one. As Vann points out, just as it would be inappropriate to narrate the 
events of the Holocaust in either a pastoral or comic emplotment, White thought it would be 
best to give up on narrative in order to portray a realistic account of the facts (160). Vann 
says the White believes this could be done 
if it is a modernist realism employing a "middle voice" (neither active or 
passive), and requiring a narrative without a narrator of objective facts, not 
taking any viewpoint outside the events it describes, exhibiting a tone of doubt 
about the interpretation of events seemingly described, open to a wide variety 
of literary devices (like interior monologues) and reconceiving conventional 
notions of time so that, for example, events can be seen not as successive 
episodes of a story, but as random occurrences. (160-1) 
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While this type of historical account would be fascinating to observe if only because it would 
share a lot of qualities with modern art, I disagree with White that such a "narratorless" 
narrative would be objective. Portraying events as random occurrences is a type of 
interpretation forced upon history, just as portraying them as a coherent pattern would be. 
No one really knows whether or not the events in history have a meaning; what we can know 
is that humans, when they write history, attribute a meaning to the events they witness or 
encounter from other historical accounts. Saying that these events do not have meaning, 
however, is to endow them with an anti-meaning-and yet this is still an interpretation. 
Contrary to Hayden White's hypothesis that if one can free oneself from narrative one can 
write objective history, historians will always be forced to write from positions of 
subjectivity. 14 
Comparison of White and Collingwood 
Nancy Partner argues that "[m]ore than any other theorist," White "has brought 
historians to acknowledge the relevance of literary critical concepts and rhetoric to their work 
and has given the linguistic medium of history an intellectual visibility it never had before" 
(167). However, Collingwood also recognized that the work of the historian was ultimately 
literary. Partner also suggests, "The constructedness of narrative and the principle of 
selection that inform all historical explanation are taken-for-granted notions these days and 
that is largely [White's] doing" (167-8). However, Collingwood pointed out long before 
White that historians had to make selections about what to include in their narratives, and he 
also stressed that asking different questions of the evidence would yield different accounts. 
Moreover, Collingwood advocated asking different questions ofthe historical evidence; he 
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Table 1. A Comparison of Some Ideas of Collingwood and White 
Collingwood White 
Nature of The historian's and novelist's The historian's work has 
Historical Writing work do not differ except the literary implications. 
historian's writing is supposed to 
be true. 
Narrative as Constructions ofhistory differ Constructions of history differ 
Constructed depending on what questions depending on what is 
are brought to the evidence. emphasized/subordinated by the 
historian. 
How to overcome The problem of The problem of 
objectivity/ objectivity/subjectivity is objectivity/subjectivity is 
subjectivity confronted by re-thinking the addressed by using the middle 
problems thoughts of others. voice (thinking one's own 
thoughts in the form of an 
interior monologue) 
Nomological Against discovering "laws" that Against discovering "laws" that 
Theory govern history, but there seems govern history, but there seems 
to still be a discernible pattern to to still be a discernible pattern 
events: epistemic progress; this to events: transition between 
pattern is linear and progressive. Vico's tropes give rise to new 
ages; this pattern is cyclical. 
Definition of "History" consists ofthe human "History" consists of real events 
"History" interpretation of past events; uninterpreted; "history" cannot 
"history" is the narrative. be described in narrative form. 
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believed that each generation should rewrite history for itself. 
In many ways, then, the ideas that have shown up in White's writings are not new 
ones to the discipline of history; they are merely ideas that have reached a larger audience 
during his lifetime than Collingwood's ideas did. Therefore, White has had the opportunity 
to develop into the controversial figure that Collingwood was not. Table 1 outlines some 
areas in which White's ideas can be seen as an extension ofCollingwoodian thought. While 
I have hinted at the similarities between the thought of Collingwood and White throughout 
the chapter, I would like to take each of these six catagories of ideas represented in Table 1 
and explain in more detail why I see Collingwood and White as essentially sharing the same 
conception of historiography. 
Nature of Historical Writing 
Although many credit White with articulating that writing history is essentially a 
literary enterprise, this notion was put forth at least thirty years earlier by Collingwood. In 
The Idea of History, Collingwood frequently draws parallels between the historian and the 
novelist: 
Each of them makes it his business to construct a picture which is partly a 
narrative of events, partly a description of situations, exhibition of motives, 
analysis of characters. Each aims at making his picture a coherent whole, 
where every character and every situation is so bound up with the rest that this 
character in this situation cannot but act this way, and we cannot imagine him 
as acting otherwise. The novel and the history must both of them make sense; 
nothing is admissible in either except what is necessary, and the judge of this 
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necessity is in both cases the imagination. Both the novel and the history are 
self-explanatory, self-justifying, the product of an autonomous or self-
authorizing activity; and in both cases this activity is the a priori imagination. 
(245-46) 
To be entirely honest, although Collingwood saw these similarities between the historian and 
the novelist, he did give three reasons why their work was different: (1) the historian's 
account must take place in a real place and time, (2) the historical account had to be 
consistent with the other accounts of history the historian accepted, and (3) the historical 
account needed to be informed by existing evidence. However, this differentiation between 
the work of the historian and the novelist is not something that White would disagree with 
Collingwood about. Despite the charges of some of his critics, White believed in real events, 
and does not advocate that historians represent these events as occurring in a fictitious place 
and time. Also, White would have certainly subscribed to the idea that a historian's written 
historical accounts should not contradict other accounts that he or she holds to. Although 
each account could only give a certain perspective on reality, White advocated coherence 
within this perspective. Finally, it is likely that a historical account not based on evidence 
would cease to fall under the domain of history for White. While he praised Burckhardt's 
non-narrative accounts despite the fact that they contain inaccuracies, it is clear that these 
inaccuracies are not elements that White desired. 
Narratives as Constructed 
Just as Collingwood tended to see historical accounts as being comprised of 
connections between nodal points (events), so too was White's conception ofhistorical 
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narrative based on the idea that a story was the result of the historian placing emphasis on 
certain events and incorporating them into a coherent whole. In fact, the thought of both 
historians can be represented in a way true to their writings by the models shown in Figure 1. 
a B--E\ I d H 
c -----------
B e 
a 
H 
f 
g 
Historical Narrative # 1 · Historical Narrative #2 
Figure 1. Historical Narrative Models 
Both Collingwood and White viewed the historical narrative as something that had been 
constructed by the historians after they selected their evidence (which both pointed out was 
not "given" -each piece of evidence had to be weighed on its own by the historian). In both 
of the diagrams above, the letters represent events (or what Collingwood called "nodal 
points"). For hypothetical historical narratives #1 and #2, I have used the lower case letters 
to denote the nodal points that do not play a role in the historical account and capital letters to 
symbolize the evidence (or events) that the historian has chosen to focus on. The lines that 
link the capital letters signify that the historian has shown, in his or her historical account, 
relationships between the events that these letters stand for. For example, in historical 
narrative #1, only events B, C, E, and Hare deemed relevant by the author. Moreover, the 
historian of this particular account is showing a causal relationship between nodal point B 
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and points C and E; events C and E, in turn, have a causal relationship with event H. In 
historical narrative #2, the historian has chosen to focus only on events B, G, and H, showing 
that event G caused events Band H. If we follow Collingwood's injunction to ask different 
questions of the evidence (evidence here is being represented by a, b, c, ... g), it follows that 
different accounts would be constructed when nodal points A, D, and Fare included. This is 
part of the reason why White acknowledged that historical narrative could never give a true 
picture of reality; real history was merely description-as soon as relationships between 
events started coming into play, the historian's account ceased to be history and began to be 
interpretation. 
White was also displeased by what Collingwood called "scissors and paste" history. 
In an echo of Collingwood, White writes, "Many historians continue to treat their 'facts' as 
though they were 'given' and refuse to recognize, unlike most scientists, that they are not so 
much found as constructed by the kinds of questions which the investigator asks of the 
phenomena before him" ( 43). In the above diagram, whether nodal point "a" should be 
understood as "A" or "a" is something that is left for the historian to decide, but he or she 
should realize that certain questions will prompt the evidence to be read as "A" rather than 
"a." Collingwood concurs with this notion, saying: 
The evidence available for solving any given problem changes with every 
change of historical method and with every variation in the competence of 
historians. The principles by which this evidence is interpreted change too; 
since the interpreting of evidence is a task to which a man must bring 
everything he knows: historical knowledge, knowledge of nature and man, 
mathematical knowledge, philosophical knowledge; and not knowledge only, 
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but mental habits and possessions of every kind: and none of these is 
unchanging. (Idea 248) 
For Collingwood, a permanent historical account could never be written because people's 
ways of apprehending historical evidence would always be in flux. In this manner, both he 
and White acknowledge that narratives are temporal human constructs of historic events. 
How to Overcome Objectivity/Subjectivity Problems 
While Collingwood saw the destruction of the distinction between objectivity and 
subjectivity when one re-thought the thoughts of others, White overcame this barrier by 
proposing that the historian write in the middle voice, using sentences in which the narrator 
was simultaneously both subject and object. Both thinkers, however, were highly conscious 
of the problem of human subjectivity when conveying history objectively was the historian's 
goal. Admittedly, White takes this a step further than Collingwood, if only because 
Collingwood appeared to be more interested in showing the artificial differentiation between 
subjectivity and objectivity than in actually attempting to escape subjectivity altogether. 
While Collingwood stressed that scholarship could never be purely objective because the 
researcher would always be a part of the research, he was not alarmed by this subjectivity. 
White, on the other hand, seemed to suggest that once narrative is abandoned, something that 
approaches an objective view ofhistory can be obtained. Although each man reached 
different solutions ofhow to overcome problems relating to the impossibility of pure 
objectivity, that they both spent great efforts investigating these problems at all suggests that 
they might have shared a common intellectual influence. 
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Nomological Theory 
Actually, both Collingwood and White shared an intellectual heritage from Vico and 
Croce, and both men drew from Vico's pattern of the evolution ofhistory to come up with 
nomological theories of their own. One would not expect that Collingwood, who was at odds 
with the logical positivists, would delineate a "covering law" model that explained history. 
Yet ironically, he perceived a progressive pattern in history, probably because of his 
fondness for the thought of Vi co, who first proposed different ascending and cyclical stages 
or eras of history: poetic, heroic, and human. Because Collingwood saw human history 
primarily as intellectual history, he believed that each new era of history was ushered in by a 
change in the epistemological basis for knowledge. Therefore, human knowledge progressed 
from artistic to religious, from religious to scientific, from scientific to historical, and finally 
culminated in a philosophical age. Not only did these five stages apply to human history, 
Collingwood also believed that individual human intellects developed in this pattern. 
Perhaps also because of White's admiration for Vico, he also saw similar patterns in 
history as writers moved from telling accounts from one emplotment structure to another. 
Although Collingwood's model was a linear one, White stayed truer to Vico's model, 
believing that the shifts in emplotment structures were ultimately cyclical. However, the 
nomological theories of both men suggest that despite a growing tendency to view them as 
postmodernists, we must keep in mind that some of their ideas were tenaciously rooted in a 
much older tradition and actually conflict with postmodern ways of viewing the world. 
Definition of History 
One of the ways in which Collingwood and White differed was in their definitions of 
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history. Yet it is in their varying definitions that we find that their conceptions of the actual 
events of history in relationship to narrative accounts of those events was actually the same. 
Although Collingwood considered history to be written accounts of past events and White 
considered it to be real events in the past, both thinkers knew that events that had happened 
could not be accurately portrayed in writing. Moreover, as I stressed before, both men saw 
historical knowledge as inchoate and web-like. While their conceptions of past events and 
human grasp of them appear to be the same, each thinker merely assigned the term "history" 
to different notions that they actually held in common; therefore, the nature of history would 
not have been a point of disagreement between them. 
* * * 
In conclusion, the same historians who embraceR. G. Collingwood's philosophy of 
history need not be fearful of the ideas of Hayden White, if only because so many of his 
ideas run in the same vein as those ofthe former Oxford don's. While all of White's ideas 
might not be palatable to traditional historians, this does not excuse their rejection of his 
thought merely because it is his. Most of the important concepts that White contributes to 
historiography are notions that have their origins in Collingwood, ideas that flowed from 
Croce to Collingwood and had an earlier beginning in Vico. If historians had only applied 
the historiographical concerns of Collingwood to their work the first time around, perhaps 
White would not be the controversial figure in the discipline of history that he is today. 
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CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION: A "POSTMODERNIST" APPROACH 
TO THE 1919 "SPEECH" CASES 
Now that I have examined the objections to postmodemism by traditional historians 
and looked at the thought of two philosophers ofhistory who offered ideas on how to write 
history from a "postmodem" viewpoint, I would like to develop a methodology for writing 
history and test it on a concrete example. Although I am calling my methodology 
"postmodem," it is only very loosely so, especially as I wish to acknowledge some of the 
concerns about postmodernism that are voiced by traditional historians. Moreover, I am 
seeking to refine and apply the thought of two thinkers who, although they are denigrated as 
"postmodemists" at times, cannot be thought of as postmodemists in the purest sense of the 
word. 
I should add that the application of this new methodology is highly experimental; I 
am testing these ideas against a problem of history to see if they will indeed work when 
applied to historical narrative. If my methodology derived partially from Collingwood and 
White is only modestly successful, I can comment on why this is so and suggest future steps 
to correct my methodology. The reader should be aware that my methodology represents 
ways in which the thought of Collingwood and White might be invoked; it is certainly not the 
only way to apply the ideas of these two thinkers. 
My "Postmodernist" Methodology 
Drawing heavily from the thought of Collingwood and White, I have come up with 
the following six principles that I wish to follow when constructing my own historical 
narrative: 
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1. Start with an epistemological view that is suitable for the study of history. 
2. Explore the context that one brings to the body of evidence on one's 
subject. 
3. Ask questions of the texts under examination that are related to the pressing 
concerns of one's time and culture. 
4. Given that knowledge is web-like and one's account certainly cannot take 
into all factors that were possible influences on the subject, one should try 
to admit what one is leaving out of one's narrative. 
5. Attempt to discern and point out a "pregeneric" plot structure in one's 
narrative; if one cannot, at least make mention of the way that one's 
attempt to write a narrative is endowing meaning to the events. 
6. Link the historical knowledge in one's account with some sort of practical 
application; such a practice would move away from doing history for its 
own sake, but use history to serve another purpose. 
In this section of my paper, I will offer more detailed description of my six principles. Then, 
with these principles in mind, I will begin my narrative about the development of the written 
opinions in two 1919 U.S. Supreme Court cases: Schenck and Abrams. These two cases were 
part of a series of cases that were later termed the "Speech" cases because they were amongst 
the first cases that required the Court to consider the meaning behind the freedom of speech 
clause of the First Amendment. The notable thing about the two cases is that although they 
were parallel cases decided in the same way, the Supreme Court used different precedents in 
their written majority opinions for them. Most of the material contained in my narrative is 
from a seminar paper that I wrote for a course in Cultural Studies; I was attempting to 
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explain the reason why the Court failed to use the "Clear and Present Danger" test in Abrams 
when they had used it less than a year earlier in Schenck by looking at how the concept of 
hegemony played into that decision. However, I have revised the paper by taking out the 
references to Cultural Studies theory (although Cultural Studies undoubtedly has influenced 
how I have discerned relationships between certain events and not others) and instead 
focussing on my six principles of my methodology for "postmodemist" historiography. 
After the narrative, I will draw some conclusions about how well my six principles worked 
and what this might mean for the future ofpostmodemism and historiography. 
Using an Epistemology or View of Knowledge Appropriate for History 
At the heart of Collingwood's debates with the realists was disagreement over the 
best epistemological viewpoint from which to study history. The realists wanted to study 
history using scientific empiricism; Collingwood desired to help develop a different approach 
to historical inquiry. Regardless of whether one is a positivist or a postmodemist, all would 
agree that history is unknowable to a degree (whether great or small) by virtue of unreliable 
and lost evidence, and therefore one should consider writing history with a tone of 
tentativeness. For example, to show my limited degree of certainty about the nature of the 
relationship between past events, I could write, "Given that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was 
upset that many people had misinterpreted his written opinion in Schenck, he might have 
dissented from the Court in Abrams because he wanted a chance to clarify what he meant by 
"clear and present danger." Although I am under the assumption that most current historical 
accounts communicate a degree of uncertainty in their presentations of events anyway, I 
would make it more of a visible practice. 
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Of course, it seems as if historians and postmodernists misunderstand one another 
when it comes to representing the "truth." As we saw in Chapter One, both Chris Lorenz and 
David D. Roberts believe that history today is represented in provisional ways. It is probable 
that no historian writes with the belief that his or her account is unimpeachably true. As new 
evidence emerges and as ways of interpreting that evidence change, so do historical accounts. 
This is what Collingwood was trying to show in the age of positivism. 
Because postmodernism informs us that there are a plurality of epistemological 
viewpoints-many of which are equally valid-a good basis for the study of history seems to 
be one that incorporates a high degree of humility and tentativeness towards the statements 
one makes. We do not really know what happened in the past; based on the evidence that we 
have, all we can do is make well-informed guesses about probability. Writers of history do 
their readers a disservice if they write in a way that obscures this fact. 
Describing the Historian 's Context 
Just as writing a comprehensive historical account is impossible, so is fully describing 
the context one writes from, and yet I advocate that it be done because it is better to know a 
little about a writer's context than nothing at all. Collingwood pointed out that the historian's 
context is part of his or her study (Idea 248), and White saw context as a major factor that led 
one to match a plot structure with events (Tropics 85). Before plunging into their historical 
narratives, historians might explain how they perceive their own contexts-the historical, 
cultural, social, and personal facets of that context. Also, there will be certain factors 
influencing historians' interpretations of the evidence that they are blind to; therefore, 
historians might want to remind their readers that there are inevitable omissions to the 
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historians' own descriptions of their contexts. Even though explaining one's context would 
be just as problematic as writing history, doing so would be better than assuming a stance as 
an unbiased observer who can produce an objective account. Moreover, the resulting 
document might eventually serve as an historical record of how the historians perceived his 
or her own context and how he or she made the past fit present concems. 15 
Asking Questions that are Relevant to the Present 
Collingwood's idea that every generation needs to ask different questions of the 
historical evidence has profound implications for a "postmodem" historiography. When 
synthesized with his notion that historical knowledge should be useful and applied to the 
present, this idea becomes very powerful. When approaching a text, the questions that the 
historian asks of it should fit the needs and concerns of the society that historian serves. 
Historians probably do this intuitively (and therefore automatically) today, but it would be 
better if more conscious thought be given to the questions that a historian asks. 
Acknowledging the "Web-Like" Structure of Historical Knowledge 
If one accepts Collingwood and White's view ofknowledge as "web-like," then 
conclusions about the relationships between pieces of evidence that are nodal points of the 
web must be drawn. Because of this, when writing a history, I would try to inform my 
readers about what pieces of evidence I am foregrounding and what factors I deem to be less 
important to my account. Of course, it would be impossible to acknowledge all ofthe factors 
that could potentially be evidence (e.g., does the fact that it was unusually warm in the room 
where Justice Holmes was writing his dissenting opinion contribute somehow to the 
------------~ ~ ~----~ ~- ----
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expressive language that he used?), so even by admitting that I am highlighting certain bits of 
evidence and considering others irrelevant, I am forced to select what I include in the 
irrelevant category. At the same time, by pointing out to the reader that historical knowledge 
is web-like and that my account has certainly not taken everything into consideration, I will 
not mislead my readers into thinking that my account is objective. 
Identifying Plot Structures/Meaning Makers 
After composing my narrative, I think it would be a good idea to analyze it and see if 
a "pregeneric" plot structure, to use White's terminology, is identifiable. If a "pregeneric" 
plot structure is present, it could be that I am attempting to give the events of the account 
meaning by using a structure by whose terms I have been enculturated to view the world. 
Even if a "pregeneric" plot structure cannot be determined from my narrative, because I am 
still attempting to make meaning by showing the relationships between events where they 
might or might not exist, White would want me to make this clear to the reader in some 
manner. 
Linking Historical Knowledge with Practical Benefits 
Like Collingwood, I do not think that history should be done for its own sake. At the 
same time, it is not necessarily the historian's responsibility to make practical use ofhis or 
her scholarship; that may be done by others. Yet, because White laments that there is little 
connection between historical inquiry and use of that knowledge by other fields, at least 
some historians should start putting the knowledge that they gain to use or at least offer 
suggestions as to what problems in other fields that knowledge can elucidate. For example, 
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showing the disasters caused by Justice Holmes's initial ambiguity in his written opinion for 
Schenck could help instruct rhetoricians and writers about the importance of writing as 
concretely and specifically as possible. Writing that can be broadly interpreted might 
initially create the illusion that compromise has been successfully reached between various 
opinions, but this is no substitute for genuine agreement based on similar perceptions of the 
issues at hand. Such knowledge, derived from the set of historical events that I have retold in 
the following narrative, could be useful in all sorts of practical arenas such as political 
science, international relations, business management, and law. 16 
Application: "Postmodernist" Historiography and Schenck and Abrams 
Narrative: The History of the Written Opinions Handed Down by the Supreme Court in 
Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States 
Because both intellectual history and legal history fascinate me, I am going to relate 
to the reader what I perceive to be the development of the written opinions in two 1919 
"Speech" Cases. Specifically, my focus is on the question why the Supreme Court used 
different legal precedents for the two cases when they were almost identical. I have chosen 
to look at this particular set of cases because I personally believe that government should not 
interfere with speech; instead, I think that speech should be regulated by social pressures, and 
those who transgress speech norms should have the right to become societal outcasts if they 
would rather face this consequence than the self-censorship of their speech. 
Because of my own opinions regarding the freedom of speech, I believe that Schenck 
and Abrams were decided wrongly, although they did bring about two of the most eloquent 
judicial opinions that I have ever read, both penned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
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However, Holmes did not always write for the winning side; while he wrote for the majority 
in the first case, he dissented in the second. Like most judicial historians, I believe that this 
shift in opinions on Holmes's part was due to regret and personal growth during the time 
between the cases; however, Holmes claimed that his legal opinion never changed; it was 
merely differences of severity of the two crimes that led him to decide in a heterogeneous 
fashion. While the truth can never be fully known, the following is a narrative showing why 
I see the evidence pointing in the direction of remorse on Holmes's part. 
In Schenck v. United States, a unanimous Court agreed to convict the Socialist 
appellants for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 because they mailed leaflets to Americans 
who had been drafted, urging them to stand up for their rights and resist the draft. One of the 
arguments used in Charles T. Schenck's defense was that the Espionage Act violated his First 
Amendment right of freedom of speech. This was the first instance in American history that 
the Supreme Court had been asked to interpret the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment. Holmes wrote the opinion of the court, expressing what came to be known as 
the "clear and present danger" test: 
The question in every case is whether the words are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war 
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its 
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no 
Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. (qtd. in 
Epstein and Walker 229) 
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In conjunction with the Schenck opinion, Holmes also wrote the opinions of Frohwerk v. 
United States and Debs v. United States, companion cases also dealing with anti-sedition 
laws. In all three cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the rulings ofthe lower courts. 
When the 1917 Espionage Act was crafted, the United States was at war. According 
to John E. Semonche, the Espionage Act was the most "repressive ban on speech" since the 
Sedition Act of 1798 (170). The Espionage Act was justified in the minds of most 
Americans, who-like their counterparts in Europe-were seized with zealous forms of 
patriotism and nationalism. If we were to view these events as part of a romantic plot 
structure, we could emphasize that when President Woodrow Wilson declared war, even the 
party lines between Democrats and Republicans were essentially destroyed-so intent were 
politicians in uniting America against Germany. A speech addressed to the Senate on April 
4, 1917, by Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge elucidates a common sentiment of the 
time: "The worst of all wars is a feeble war. War is too awful to be entered upon half-
heartedly. If we fight at all, we must fight for all we are worth. It must be no weak, 
hesitating war. The most merciful war is that which is most vigorously waged and which 
comes most quickly to an end" (725). Probably because it threatened to prolong the war, 
resistance to the United States' war effort was viewed as not only a challenge to democracy 
and capitalism but also as an endangerment to the lives of American soldiers. 
In such an environment, it was probably highly unpopular for the Court to overturn 
the convictions of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. It might have been impossible to exonerate 
Schenck even if the majority ofthe justices had wished to uphold a literal interpretation of 
the First Amendment. After all, the Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech" (emphasis mine). Granted, a sizeable percentage of 
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Americans did not surrender to the rabid patriotism that characterized the spirit of the age. 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a Harvard law professor who was a champion for free speech, noted at 
the time that "thoughtful men and journals" objected to the Espionage Act and the restriction 
of the freedom of speech that it imposed (7). But given the historical context of the aftermath 
of WWI, when questions of individual rights conflicted with the right of government to 
protect national security, it is likely that the majority of the nation sided with the 
government's interest. It is possible that the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's 
decision in Schenck because to do otherwise would have diminished the leadership of the 
Court. 
In Schenck, the Court's decision was unanimous; the opinion issued by the Court 
accommodated its members' diverse legal reasoning in one singular statement. Even though 
it was possibly a major factor, the influence of American patriotism only partly determined 
the Court's ability to reach a unanimous decision in the case. Unanimity was only possible 
because other factors as well convinced each member of the Court to vote against the 
appellant. For instance, the Court's most liberal member and one most likely to rule in favor 
of free speech-Justice Louis Brandeis-probably did not think very deeply about the 
Espionage Act's implications on the First Amendment. Later, Brandeis would tell Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, "I have never been quite happy about my concurrence in the Debs and 
Schenck cases. I had not then thought the issues of freedom of speech out. I thought at the 
subject, not through it" ( qtd. in Cohen 21 ). 
Ironically, Justice Holmes, the author of the Schenck decision and the most pivotal 
justice in the 1919 speech cases, personally did not want to convict Schenck and the others. 
However, Holmes opted instead to follow his legal philosophy, which required him to sustain 
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the convictions. Holmes's philosophy of law was very controversial; he was an ultimate 
pragmatist and positivist who believed that laws needed to be clear so that a transgression of 
them would bring about a predictable punishment. "Law was not to be understood as 
politically liberal or conservative, but as a systematic approach that aimed for scientific 
consistency" (Cohen 61 ). Probably partly because he was an agnostic, Holmes believed that 
moral arguments should be kept out of the courtroom because they could have no basis in 
fact and thus would interfere with the predictability of the law (64-65). "Holmes also argued 
that the law did, and should, adopt a definite policy of requiring only outward conformity" 
(Rogat and O'Fallon 1363). To him, laws were prophecies that told people how to act ifthey 
wanted to avoid certain consequences. The justice once told an audience of law students, 
"People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming 
against what is so much stronger than themselves" (Cohen 63-64). Holmes believed that bad 
laws should be corrected, but this was only to be done by the legislature and only after 
competing social groups had battled until one set ofbeliefs became triumphant (Rogat and 
O'Fallon 1367-68). In his book, The Common Law, Holmes wrote, "The law embodies the 
story of a nation's development through many centuries ... " (5). It appears that he believed 
that the judiciary had no business in tampering with the nation's development; the courts 
should only enforce the laws that already exist. 
Because he did not think that the Court should override legislation, Holmes was 
committed to the rule oflaw, which required Schenck's conviction because he had clearly (to 
Holmes at least) violated the Espionage Act. While it appears that Holmes thought the 
Espionage Act to be bad legislation, his view of legislative law as in a state of constant 
evolution assured him that Congress would eventually change the law, and, barring that, the 
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President could step in and pardon Schenck and the others. 
Additionally, Holmes was led to agree with the majority of the Court in Schenck 
because he, like Brandeis, probably did not thoroughly consider the implications of the 
Espionage Act on the First Amendment. In a letter to a friend dated AprilS, 1919, Holmes 
admitted that he had "dealt with [free speech] somewhat summarily in ... Schenck v. US." 
(Howe, Holmes-Pollock Letters, 7). It appears that Holmes did not consider the speech 
clause of the First Amendment the major factor in the case. It probably never occurred to 
Holmes that he was crafting a weighty opinion that would forever influence how questions of 
the legal limits of free speech are decided in the United States. "Judging from the Justice's 
attitude in [the speech case] decisions, moreover, it would almost seem that the reference to 
'clear and present danger' in the Schenck case was a casual remark, a bit of neat verbalization 
on the part of a man given to terse expression" (Konefsky 201). 
Immediately after writing the opinions for Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, Justice 
Holmes seemed to regret his actions. In a letter to Harold J. Laski, a friend and instructor at 
Harvard more than fifty years Holmes's junior, dated March 16, 1919, Holmes wrote 
I sent you yesterday some opinions in the Debs and other similar cases .... I 
greatly regretted having to write them-and (between ourselves) that the 
Government pressed them to a hearing. Of course I know that donkeys and 
knaves would represent us as concurring in the condemnation of Debs because 
he was a dangerous agitator. Of course, too, so far as that is concerned, he 
might split his guts without my interfering with him or sanctioning 
interference. But on the only questions before us I could not doubt about the 
law. The federal judges seem to me (again between ourselves) to have got 
---------~-··-
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hysterical about the war. I should think the President when he gets through 
with his present amusements might do some pardoning. (Howe, Holmes-Laski 
Letters 142-43) 
Two days later, Laski replied with the following: 
I read your three opinions with great care; and though I say it with deep regret 
they are very convincing. The point, I take it, is that to act otherwise would 
be simply to substitute judicial discretion for executive indiscretion with the 
presumption of knowledge against you. I think you would agree that none of 
the accused ought to have been prosecuted; but since they have been and the 
statute is there, the only remedy lies in the field of pardon. Your analogy of a 
cry of fire in a theatre is, I think, excellent, though in the remarks you make in 
the Schenck case I am not sure that I should not have liked the line to be 
drawn a little tighter about executive discretion. The Espionage Act tends to 
mean the prosecution of all one's opponents who are unimportant enough not 
to arise [sic] public opinion. (143) 
In his next letter to Laski more than two weeks later, Holmes does not mention the three 
cases any further except to say "a labor union ... yesterday sent me a protest against the Debs 
decision, at once cocksure and hopelessly ignorant of all about it" (144). Holmes's 
references to Debs in future letters would always be accompanied by an expression that his 
opinion in the case (and presumably in Schenck and Frohwerk) had been misunderstood by 
both the public in general and especially by proponents of labor and socialism. This 
misunderstanding would become a significant factor of his reworking of the "clear and 
present danger" test in Abrams as we will eventually see. 
---------------
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I must pause here and address the nature of the "clear and present danger" test in 
Schenck. Today, this test is applauded by civil libertarians, but in its original context, this 
test could have functioned as a license for the government to restrict speech according to its 
own standards of "danger." The test as it stands by itself is ambiguous; Schenck left the 
courts a lot of room to decide on their own what kinds of speech were protected and what 
kinds were not. This should not be surprising, given that Schenck arose from a very inchoate 
discussion of the limits of free speech. The newness of the test probably caused Holmes to 
ignore it in his Frohwerk and Debs opinions. Samuel J. Konefsky contends that "[a] close 
look at the paragraph in which Holmes introduces the idea of 'clear and present danger' 
shows that he was not primarily concerned with propounding a new test of constitutionality" 
(192). Justice Frankfurter, a later justice who was well acquainted with Holmes, did not 
consider "clear and present danger" to be a legal test, but rather a "felicitous" and "literary" 
phrase (202). 
Jeremy Cohen argues that the "impact of the First Amendment was lost in Schenck 
because Holmes applied the logic of past nonspeech cases to his judicial reasoning. Holmes 
was unwilling or unable to see the speech component of Schenck as a unique issue" (109). 
Cohen further claims that the methodology that Holmes used to derive the "clear and present 
danger" test shows that Holmes was more concerned with "criminal law precedent and 
generalized principles" than the language of the First Amendment (96). However, it is 
probably helpful to remember that when considering the first case before the Supreme Court 
to question the meaning of the speech clause, Holmes had to rely on precedent from non-
speech cases. Perhaps this is why the emphasis in the opinion Holmes wrote for Schenck was 
not on the defendant's speech, but rather on his actions. 
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In order to settle the legal questions posed in Schenck, it was not necessary for 
Holmes to interpret the free speech clause ofthe First Amendment (Cohen 110). Even 
though Schenck's lawyers brought up the speech issue, ironically the legal test that they 
proposed regarding the limits of free speech might have also been a factor that led Holmes to 
sustain Schenck's conviction. Schenck's legal team wanted the Court to decide the case 
based on "whether an expression is made with sincere purpose to communicate honest 
opinion or belief, or whether it masks a primary intent to incite to forbidden action, or 
whether it does, in fact, incite to forbidden action" (35). Perhaps the government 
prosecutors, John Lord O'Brian and Alfred Bettman, exploited the flaw in the defense's test 
when they argued that the case did not involve free speech but rather the action of mailing 
the circulars to those who had already been drafted-an action that involved willfully 
obstructing the draft. Because Schenck's own lawyers conceded that action was punishable 
whereas speech was not, "Holmes said, in essence, that Congress could prohibit an act that 
occurred in the guise of speech" (1 00-1 ). In deciding Schenck, Holmes apparently did not 
consider what was written on the leaflets that Schenck printed but rather focused on how his 
action of mailing them to men whom had been drafted constituted an infringement of the 
Espionage Act. 
Because Holmes personally stood in favor of free speech, Chief Justice Edward D. 
White might have realized that Holmes's more progressive views had to be accommodated if 
all nine justices were to stand together on this case. It might seem strange that Holmes was 
chosen to write the opinion, given that his concurrence with the majority was probably not 
due to his personal principles or convictions but to his desire that his legal decisions be 
consistent with his philosophy of law. Less than a month after the Schenck opinion had been 
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handed down, Holmes confessed to Sir Frederick Pollock that he believed that he "should go 
farther probably than the majority in favor of [free speech]" and that it is probably "partly on 
that account that the C.J. [Chief Justice] assigned the case to [him]" (Howe, Holmes-Pollock 
Letters 7). By allowing Holmes to write the opinion for the majority, Chief Justice White 
might have been trying to appease any of Holmes's putative impulses to write a concurring 
opinion or else disagree with the Court altogether in dissent. Moreover, by having one of the 
two most progressive members of the Court write the opinion for somewhat of a reactionary 
(although it mirrored the sentiments of the time) decision, the Chief Justice could strengthen 
the authority of the decision reached by the Court in Schenck. Chief Justice White may have 
thought that the more progressive sector of the American population would support the 
Court's decisions in the speech cases when they discovered those decisions had been penned 
by their compatriot Justice Holmes. 
Eight months after the Schenck opinion was issued, the opinion for Abrams v. United 
States, yet another anti-sedition law case involving the freedom of speech, was delivered. 
The two cases were very similar; however, in Abrams the defendants distributed their leaflets 
in a less calculating way: by throwing them out ofwindows ofbuildings in New York City. 
In the Court's written opinion for Abrams, all but two of the justices-Holmes and 
Brandeis-laid aside the more liberal "clear and present danger" test and opted to use the 
more stringent "bad tendency" test, originally crafted by federal Judge Learned Hand, who 
had recently derived the test from English common law. This test essentially asks, "Do the 
words have the tendency to bring about something evil?"-an easier question to answer in 
the affirmative. The Court could have affirmed Abrams's conviction under the "clear and 
present danger" test that proceeded from the Schenck case, so "[ w ]hy the majority shifted 
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constitutional standards is a mystery." (Epstein and Walker 230). 
The majority of the Court probably decided to convict Abrams for the same reasons 
they convicted Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. Although eight months had passed between 
Schenck and Abrams and the war had been over for almost a year, it seems that the majority 
of the Court failed to take into account this changed environment. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
writes that after armistice, the President pardoned or commuted most of the sentences of 
those convicted under the Espionage Act, but the trial courts were still filled with cases 
involving the 1917 Act as well as state anti-sedition laws (52, n. 30). A number of cases 
involving anti-sedition laws that went to the Supreme Court in the 1920s suggest that 
although the war was over, patriotism was not. By the time Abrams was tried, the Court had 
the precedents arising from Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs to follow for speech cases. 
Because the free speech clause of the First Amendment had not been seriously considered in 
these three previous cases, the Court was not compelled to do so in Abrams. 
Even though eight months had not made a difference to the majority of the members 
ofthe Supreme Court, those eight months in 1919-including a summer recess of the 
Court--changed the context from which Justices Holmes and Brandeis were to view Abrams. 
We have already seen that immediately after Holmes wrote the opinions for the earlier 
speech cases, he was perturbed by what he perceived as the misinterpretation of his ideas in 
Schenck by socialists and other progressive thinkers. In April of 1919, a group ofltalian 
Communists attempted to mail thirty bombs to prominent officials, one of whom was 
Holmes-who was presumably targeted for writing the opinions for the speech cases. The 
justice spoke rather jokingly about the experience in a letter to Pollock: "It is one of the 
ironies that I, who probably take the extremest [sic] view in favor of free speech (in which, in 
85 
the abstract, I have no very enthusiastic belief, though I hope I would die for it), that I should 
have been selected for blowing up" (Howe, Holmes-Pollock Letters 29). He casually 
mentioned the incident in a letter to Laski in between two comments about British literature: 
"I suppose it was the Debs incident that secured me the honor of being among those destined 
to receive an explosive machine" (Howe, Haimes-Laski Letters 149). While it is unlikely 
that Holmes was threatened into dissenting in Abrams because of the attempt on his life, the 
bomb may have alerted him of the dire need to clarify what he meant by the "clear and 
present danger" test in Schenck. He would be presented with the opportunity to rearticulate 
what he meant by the test in his dissent in Abrams. 
Although Schenck and Abrams appear to be parallel cases that should have been 
decided in congruent ways, for the rest of his life Holmes unwaveringly clung to the position 
that he had decided rightly in Schenck. Even so, many legal scholars agree with Semonche 
that "the difference between Holmes's opinion for the Court in Schenck and his dissent in 
Abrams reflects the personal education that took place in the eight months between the two 
decisions" (174). Most scholars attribute this change to Justice Brandeis's influence on 
Holmes, but it has even been argued that Laski arranged a tea with Chafee and Holmes where 
Chafee convinced Holmes that he should use the next opportunity he had to protect the 
freedom of speech (Rogat and O'Fallon 1378). However, not only would Chafee's alleged 
request probably have been repulsive to Holmes's legal philosophy, but Holmes never once 
expressed that he wished to recant his position in Schenck. In fact, he affirmed his Schenck 
decision in his Abrams dissent. While we should not underestimate the influence that his 
colleague Justice Brandeis had on him during the eight months following Schenck, it is a 
more likely scenario that the one big difference that Holmes perceived between the two 
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cases-that the nature of the danger posed by Abrams was very minor-played a larger role 
in his dissent. 
Holmes's legal opinions consistently show that if there were a serious clash between 
governmental and individual rights, he would decide in favor of the former. However, 
Holmes did not view Abram's actions as a serious endangerment of the interests ofthe 
government. Hence he expresses in his dissent, "Now nobody can suppose that the 
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present 
any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government arms or 
have any appreciable tendency to do so" (qtd. in Epstein and Walker 233). Unlike Schenck, 
who specifically targeted his leaflet to those who had been drafted, Abrams distributed his 
circulars by throwing them out of a window of a building in New York City. Konefsky 
argues that in Abrams, "[n]either the majority nor the minority questioned the 
constitutionality of the legislation under which the indictment was brought; the disagreement 
between them turned on the evaluation of the circumstances from which danger could be 
inferred" (209). John H. Wigmore attributed "the opposite interpretations of the majority and 
the minority [ ... ] to differences of temperament and attitude towards the issues involved" 
( qtd. in 209). Perhaps this was the case. Holmes later wrote of the triad of speech cases, "I 
could not see the wisdom of pressing the cases, especially when the fighting was over" ( qtd. 
in G. White 423). Both Holmes and Brandeis did not consider national security to be in such 
peril that it would necessitate a continuance of the Espionage Act when the war was ended, 
but then again, Holmes had never seen the need for such a law in the first place. This may be 
because Holmes did not busy himself with keeping up with current affairs and politics-he 
rarely read newspapers. Enamored with philosophy and literature instead, he was probably 
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sheltered from the influence that cultural pressures that united the country behind the war 
effort. Therefore, unlike most people at that time, it is possible that Holmes did not perceive 
speech that opposed the American military as threatening. 
Another factor that likely contributed to Holmes and Brandeis's dissent from the 
majority of the Court was that, for the first time, the two seriously considered the 
implications of anti-sedition laws on the First Amendment. 17 Most scholars assume that by 
the time of Abrams, Brandeis's own views in favor of the freedom of speech had been 
solidified; since he had no qualms as Holmes did about deciding cases based on personal 
moral convictions, he was easily persuaded by Abrams's legal team. Brandeis's own legal 
philosophy was directly opposite to that of Holmes; Brandeis believed that through their 
opinions, justices, like statesmen, should help craft the law to fit the expediencies of the 
times (cf. Konefsky 302ft). 
Although his personal opinion of the case conflicted with the view his legal 
philosophy provided, it is possible that in Abrams, unlike in Schenck, Holmes based his 
decision on his personal convictions, essentially changing his mind about the preeminence 
his legal philosophy had over his conscience. It is likely that Brandeis played an integral part 
in accounting for Holmes's switch. Perhaps Holmes was led to decide Abrams with his heart 
rather than his head because of a newfound zeal for the benefits of free speech in a 
democratic society. The external evidence points in the direction that Holmes's views on 
free speech shifted radically over the eight months between Schenck and Abrams; "until his 
dissent in the Abrams case, Holmes always discussed free speech from the standpoint of the 
interests of society in curbing it" (Konefsky 193). Holmes scholar G. Edward White states 
that Holmes's dissent in Abrams "was to an important extent a response to suggestions 
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implicitly and explicitly made to Holmes by others" (412). It is perhaps the negative 
response to his opinion in Debs from his young Harvard colleagues, whom Holmes 
respected, that caused him to foreground his beliefs on free speech in his dissent in Abrams 
(Rogat and O'Fallon 1378). 
Ironically, Holmes was not usually inclined to offer dissenting opinions. While 
Holmes's eloquent dissent in Abrams would earn him the title "The Great Dissenter," the 
times that Holmes either concurred with the Court's opinion or wrote the majority opinion 
himself outnumber his dissents by what Alfred Lief estimates as "eight or ten to one" ( qtd. in 
Konefsky 1 03). Holmes abhorred the new sobriquet he earned from his Abrams opinion 
because he did not want to be viewed as a dissenter. Because his dissents were so rare, it is 
especially notable that he dissented in Abrams. 
In his dissent in Abrams, Holmes clarified his opinion in Schenck by stressing, 
It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about 
that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where 
private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to 
change the mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the 
surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, 
would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the 
success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so. 
[ ... ] Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the 
correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the 
sweeping command, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
of speech" (qtd. in Epstein and Walker 233). 
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The above effectively accomplished Holmes's goal of championing free speech, and was 
intended to show that he had stood for free speech in his earlier decisions, which he argued 
were decided rightly. Whether or not Holmes really supported free speech at the time of the 
first three speech cases is not really our concern; what matters is that Holmes was intent on 
using his decision in Abrams to show his progressive colleagues that they were wrong to 
interpret Schenck as a stroke against the First Amendment. However, it is likely that Holmes 
was rewriting legal history-his own legal history-to support his current views on civil 
liberties. 
The Abrams case shows that the majority of the Court had to accommodate the 
dissenting opinion in writing their own opinion. The majority was unable to apply the "clear 
and present danger" test because they were beaten to it by Holmes, who probably wanted to 
use Abrams as a chance to clarify this legal doctrine to exonerate himself from 
misinterpretations of Schenck. It would have been impossible for both the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Abrams to use the same legal test for support because the author-and 
therefore the authority--of that test were on the dissenting side. Had the majority read the 
"clear and present danger" precedent as justifying the conviction of Abrams, they would have 
stood in direct contradiction with the "initial" intent of that test, as clarified in the dissent by 
Holmes. Had Holmes not been present to interpret the "clear and present danger" test in the 
way he wanted, the majority ofthe Court could have used it to sustain their opinion. 
To sum up my perspective of the evidence, perhaps it is no great mystery why the 
Court resorted to Judge Hand's "Bad Tendency" test; only one author-Holmes or Justice 
John H. Clarke, who wrote for the majority-could claim the test for himself. Because 
Holmes needed his dissent in Abrams to prove that many had misunderstood his original 
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opinion in Schenck, he took that opportunity. Even if Clarke and the majority could foresee 
that Holmes's rearticulation of"clear and present danger" would undermine their own 
opinion in Abrams (especially because Holmes had written Schenck and still claimed to hold 
to the opinion he crafted in that case), they could not prevent Holmes from using the test 
because anyone on the Court can write anything they want. Ifthe majority had used the 
"clear and present danger" to convict, this would have only exacerbated their propensity to 
appear on the wrong side of the case. Therefore, the real mystery of Abrams is not why the 
majority of the Court did not use the "clear and present danger" test, but why Holmes and 
Brandeis were unable to persuade the rest ofthe members of the Court to see the Abrams 
case their way. 
Of course, that last sentence betrays my opinion that Holmes and Brandeis were in 
the right while the rest of the court was wrong. One (ofthe numerous) biases in the above 
narrative is the tendency for it to read as a tragedy by Frye's definition. For example, it was 
a tragedy for Schenck to be convicted of the Espionage Act of 1917 when he was merely 
trying to convince drafted soldiers to not join the war effort. It was tragic that the Court 
affirmed this decision of the lower courts and tragic that Holmes and Brandeis agreed with 
this decision. However, in this narrative, we see the development of a character. Holmes 
eventually regrets his initial decision, but he is given a second chance. However, the 
majority of the Court still voted to convict, so the story ends with the triumph of the villains. 
At the same time, it is a victory for Holmes because although he could not exonerate Abrams, 
he had the chance to define the legal precedent that he invented, which would ultimately 
become some of the most famous words handed down by the bench (thanks in part to Tom 
Clancy). The reader of my narrative will probably be left with the feeling that Holmes and 
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Brandeis were the true winners in this case, if only because the rest of the members of the 
Court's reputations suffered when they could not employ the "clear and present danger" test 
in their opinion. The reader should be warned, however, that I am giving a certain meaning 
to these events, although it is a meaning that serves our society well given present attitudes 
towards the freedom of speech. However, perhaps at the time that the two cases were 
decided, no one cared to notice that the Court did not use "clear and present danger," and it is 
only in retrospect that we as an American culture have come to see the 1919 Court in the 
wrong. After all, some of us have never seen a major war. 
Finally, although the above narrative represents my beliefs as to why the Supreme 
Court used different precedents in the Schenck and Abrams cases, perhaps the knowledge 
gained from my narrative can be employed in the service of another problem inside or 
outside of the discipline ofhistory. For example, as politically and culturally important as 
Supreme Court decisions are, Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker assert that "there is 
considerable disagreement in the scholarly and legal communities about why justices decide 
cases the way they do .... " (42). However, because Supreme Court justices have formally 
unchecked power, it is of prime importance to know what drives the Court to their legal 
decisions so that the American populace is assured that it is not being tyrannized by this 
undemocratic institution. Perhaps the insight we have gained about how the Court decided to 
employ (or not employ) legal precedent in Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United 
States-two similar cases separated by just eight months-might help us understand the 
inner-workings of the Court and predict under what circumstances the Court will develop 
new legal doctrines. Perhaps my narrative could aid a political scientist writing an opinion 
piece on how and why the power of the Supreme Court should be more restricted. At any 
-- ~~ ~~ ~- ---- ---- -~ --
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rate, my narrative has offered one perspective of the Court that can broaden one's knowledge 
of legal development. 
Conclusions that can be Drawn from My Application 
After actually attempting to apply my six principles to a written historical account, I 
can make some judgements as to which principles were applicable and served me well and 
which ones did not. It was fairly easy to apply rhetorical strategies that indicated my 
tentative stance. At the same time, showing my tentativeness was challenging; if readers 
were to perceive the account as merely one equally valid perspective among innumerable 
others, they might wonder why I even chose to write about the subject unless I had reasons 
for believing my account to be more accurate than the others written to date. Although 
finding the balance between these two extremes is not an easy task, it can be done, as I have 
demonstrated. Although I did not fully expect it when I was theorizing, another one of my 
principles that seemed to be successful was making suggestions on how to apply historical 
knowledge gained from the account to other areas of inquiry. However, finding knowledge 
that would serve other disciplines could be a challenge for the historian if only because the 
practical application of historical knowledge is best done by those who have an argument or 
problem and who are looking for potential evidence or answers. In other words, other 
disciplines should turn to history; history should not arbitrarily give answers to other 
disciplines whether they want these answers or not. I can only speculate that the knowledge 
gained from looking at the relationship between the written opinions for the Schenck and 
Abrams cases could aid a political scientist or, indeed, any situation in which two groups 
with competing interests are trying to reach a written agreement that can be interpreted 
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uniformly by both groups. 
One of my principles that was met with limited success was the attempt to 
communicate to my readers that I was imposing an interpretation in the form of a plot 
structure upon the events. Even though I futilely struggled to definitively find examples of 
tragedy, romance, comedy, and irony in my narrative, I did detect a general plot pattern of 
tragic experiences that are ultimately righted in Holmes's case, and he emerges with the 
inverse of a Pyrrhic victory: a loss that comes with the great satisfaction of having the 
opposing side appear to be in the wrong. However, I did point out this bias of mine to my 
readers at the end and mentioned that at the time, perhaps the American people did not think 
the majority of the Court looked foolish for reverting to Justice Hand's "bad tendency" test. 
Because it was part of my human nature to make sense of and a story out of the details I 
regarded as important in relation to the events in my narrative, I tried to make it clear that my 
application of gestalt is not the only one. Although I did not do so, perhaps it would have 
been appropriate to reformulate the events into alternative plot structures and then respond to 
them; this would have been a good next step had I the time to review the evidence from a 
different perspective. 
The principle of asking relevant questions of my evidence seems to have been met 
automatically met by virtue of having a purpose for writing my account. I did not have to 
consciously think of the questions that I asked the texts and evidence that I was examining; 
rather, I did this tacitly. This leads me to think that Collingwood was offering description 
more than prescription when he said that each historian had to recreate the past for his or her 
own time and culture. Of course, this ensures that written history can never be objective, and 
as Collingwood mentioned, the historian is always part of the account he or she writes. 
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Collingwood noticed that he himself always had different questions when approaching the 
same text at different times, and he probably inferred that others did as well. Given that most 
(if not all) historians have a motive for studying the topics they do, I think it would be 
impossible to not ask relevant questions ofthe evidence. Therefore, this principle is done 
intuitively (I am perhaps dismissing this issue too quickly) and does not really need to be 
thought about when one is trying to practice history. Although it would be ideal if the 
historian could also be self-reflexive about the questions he or she is asking, determining 
these questions might be just as problematic as detecting history. 
Also, I found the principle of communicating to the reader the idea that history is 
"web-like" was nearly impossible. As much as I could, I included in my account all ofthe 
details that might have shaped the justices' decisions. Of course, I cannot say for sure that I 
included "all" of the evidence because surely when I did my research, I intuitively selected 
some factors as relevant and some as not. However, I do not even remember the factors I 
deemed irrelevant-and they might not be irrelevant for a different context from my own. 
Therefore, there are various lacunae in my account, but because I do not know what they are, 
I cannot alert my readers to them. My conclusion about this principle, then, is that while 
understanding historical accounts as "web-like" knowledge seems to be an accurate 
perception, it is not really something that the writer can mention in his or her narrative except 
to say something like, "There could be undiscovered evidence that, ifknown, could entirely 
change the structure and meaning of this account." 
Finally, the most difficult principle to apply to my account-and the principle that 
seems to be most frequently stressed by rhetoricians who write about historiography-was 
the attempt to explain my context and relationship to my subject or, in other words, to be 
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self-reflexive. In the opening paragraphs of the account, I attempted to alert my readers to 
the fact that my personal interest and stake in the subject may have influenced my 
conclusions about it. While I stopped short of saying it, I tried to let the readers know that I 
considered Holmes and Brandeis to be the "good guys" of the narrative; the other justices 
were the "villains." Moreover, I wrote myself into the account, if only to appease White's 
concern that the narrator appear to be objective and absent. Of course, when I got into the 
historical details of the narrative, I found it difficult to continue my presence as narrator in 
the story. The parts of the account that I have explicitly entered are only the beginning and 
the end. Except once near the end when I wrote, "To sum up my perspective of the 
evidence" (88), I did not say things like, "I think event A led to event B" in the heart ofthe 
narrative; rather, I tended to express subjectivity in terms oftentativeness ("Event A probably 
led to event B"). Admittedly, my reluctance to experiment with writing myself into the 
narrative shows that I have been socialized into thinking in terms of what history is and what 
it is not. 
I would like to stress the radical divergence from conventional historiography that 
postmodern historiography represents. In today's academic climate, "postmodernist" 
principles for doing historiography are difficult to follow. Even rhetoricians have noted that 
postmodernist historiography has not been practiced consistently by the members ofthe 
discipline of rhetoric; this is one of the points that Victor J. Vitanza makes in his '"Notes' 
Towards Historiographies ofRhetorics; or the Rhetorics of the Histories of Rhetorics; 
Traditional, Revisionary, and SubNersive."18 Vitanza laments: 
... we Rhetoricians are not self-consciously aware of the Rhetorics of Histories 
when we Write our Histories of Rhetorics. Therefore, I emphasize (again): In 
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theory, we, occasionally in our journal articles and convention presentations 
and conversations, understand Rhetorics and Ideologies; in practice, however, 
we, in our histories, ironically demonstrate a lack of awareness of them. (7 4) 
Perhaps it is so difficult for rhetoricians (and others) to practice postmodemist historiography 
because at this time there is a relative absence of examples ofpostmodem-influenced 
histories. Those that do exist (Vitanza's article for instance), seem wildly incoherent in 
places and offer no solid conclusions or knowledge that can be used in service to other 
disciplines. Maybe the traditional historian is correct: postmodemism is of little use to the 
discipline of history. It seems, and I hope to be wrong, that in order for history to serve a 
purpose in the larger world, it must search for covering laws and ways to make meaning out 
of the past. However, postmodemism resists such conceptions of history. For the time 
being, hopefully more rhetoricans like Vitanza will attempt to write postmodemist historical 
accounts that can show how history is useful to other scholarly areas. If Vitanza and others 
succeed, perhaps the discipline ofhistory will take notice and members of the general 
community of historians will begin to incorporate more anti-foundationalist approaches into 
their historiography. If rhetoricians fail in this task, however, then history and 
postmodernism probably will not have much of a future together. 
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NOTES 
1 
"Historiography," of course, has at least three meanings: (1) the literature that has 
been written about the history of a subject, (2) the methodological principles of historical 
detection, and (3) the process of writing history. In this thesis, I will use the term to refer to 
\ 
theoretical principles that inform the writing and/or the construction of historical accounts. 
2 I apologize for mentioning this work that shows up in nearly every bibliography of 
articles that deal with postmodemism. Kuhn's book itself has been somewhat mis-adopted 
by postmodemists, who claim that it is a more postmodem work than Kuhn intended. 
3 The responses to Richard Rorty by American philosophers largely attest to this fear. 
4 The fact that these articles are centered almost exclusively in one journal does not 
imply that the discipline of history is ignoring postmodemism as much as it belies historians' 
general dismissal of all theoretical issues. 
5 Of course, this phrase was not used in Collingwood's time. Carl Hempel, one of 
Richard Rorty's teachers who later told him, "You have betrayed everything I stood for," 
after reading Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (cf. Lingua Franca, Dec 2000/ Jan 
2001, p. 42) was the originator of this term. 
6 Qtd. in Parker 213 from "The Principles of History," pp. 41-4. This documentis 
part of a larger set called the Collingwood Papers, which are unpublished and housed in the 
Bodleian Library in Oxford, England. 
7 Qtd. in Parker 175 from Speculum Mentis ofthe Map of Knowledge, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1924. 
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8 Qtd. in Parker 181 from the 1994 edition of The Idea of History, which contains 
previously unpublished material. This quote is from the "Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History" given in 1926. 
9 I am assuming that "modern" in this context means "contemporary" and possibly 
even "postmodern" rather than "modern" in a sense that refers back to scientific positivism. 
1° Cf. Appleby et al., Telling the Truth About History (New York/London, 1994), p. 
53ff. 
11 Many scholars complain about the inconsistencies and contradictions that 
characterize White's work. Some attempt to avoid these problems by summarizing White's 
thought by a chronological analysis of his writings, although this approach tends to bury 
White's core ideas. Noel Carroll, in his highly critical article of White, gives perhaps the 
most comprehensive and accurate account-rather, the one that matches most closely to my 
own conception--<>fWhite's ideas. 
12 This conclusion might be reached by those who are cursorily informed about 
White's works, as one of his essays is entitled "The Value ofNarrativity." However, this 
phrase should be interpreted as arguing that narrative is not neutral-it has a value, rather 
than suggesting that narrative is valuable. 
13 Vann mentions that L. B. Cebik in "Fiction and History: A Common Core?'' 
International Studies in Philosophy 24 (1992), 47-63 claims that a "real" past or "real 
events" do not exist in White's mind. Both V ann and I would agree that this is far from the 
truth. 
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14 White would be one of the first to attest that in writing about anything, one must 
select some aspects of it and disregard the others, but some ofwhat I have left out of my 
summary of White's ideas is so major as to deserve at least a brief mention. White augments 
his lists of four emplotment structures and four tropes of description with four explanatory 
strategies (Idiographic, Organicist, Mechanistic, and Contextualist) and four ideological 
perspectives (Anarchist, Conservative, Radical, and Liberal) (70). However, it is difficult 
enough to find discussions (within the work of both White and others) of how the plots and 
the tropes inform (or should inform) the work ofwriting narratives, and it is even more of a 
challenge to find analyses of how the four explanatory strategies or the four ideologies effect 
historical accounts. While these schemes represent intriguing aspects of White's work, until 
they become of more interest to scholars, it does not make sense for me to include them in a 
discussion of how White's ideas could inform a postmodem conception of historiography. 
15 Although, if Collingwood is correct, too much evidence makes the writing of 
history nearly impossible, and given our modem day fascination with archives and electronic 
records, it is very likely that any future study of our particular historical age will be a very 
complex process indeed. 
16 Admittedly, it seems that if knowledge is to be gained from history and applied to 
other disciplines, this cannot happen unless the historian is attempting to discover "covering 
law" models. While both Collingwood and White encouraged the first and discouraged the 
latter, neither of them offers a way in which this contradiction can be overcome. Ifthere is a 
way by which this can be done (and I hope that there is), I have not thought of it. 
100 
17 Cohen argues that Schenck was not a case about the freedom of speech at all; while 
Schenck's defense argued that the Espionage Act violated the First Amendment's protection 
of free speech, the only legal questions that the Court could rule on concerned whether or not 
Schenck's actions violated the Espionage Act, and they clearly did. The constitutionality of 
the Espionage Act in light of the First Amendment was not in the purview ofthe Court to 
decide in Schenck. 
18 Vitanza says, "We are always already interpreting any text from any archive across 
at least tacitly present hermeneutical methods. Not to be conscious of those methods is to 
fall prey to perhaps a form of ideological terrorism" (93, emphasis in the original). While I 
am not saying it is impossible, I think that it is extremely challenging to "be conscious of 
those methods" (perhaps some are just too lazy to take the time to be self-reflexive), but even 
more importantly, if one believes that he or she does know the tacit methods used to address 
the text, one might mistakenly think he or she is being objective in a relative sense. This is 
dangerous as well. I think the best that can be done is to state one's methods as far as one is 
aware of them but to also be conscious that it is likely that so much more is still unknown to 
oneself and others. 
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